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ARTICLE 
GOVERNING HEALTH INFORMATION 
CRAIG KONNOTH† 
In the last few years, numerous Americans’ health information has been collected 
and used for follow-on, secondary research. This research studies correlations between 
medical conditions, genetic or behavioral profiles, and treatments, to customize 
medical care to specific individuals. Recent federal legislation and regulations make 
it easier to collect and use the data of the low-income, unwell, and elderly for this 
purpose. This would impose disproportionate security and autonomy burdens on these 
individuals. Those who are well-off and pay out of pocket could effectively exempt 
their data from the publicly available information pot. This presents a problem which 
modern research ethics is not well equipped to address. Where it considers equity at 
all, it emphasizes underinclusion and the disproportionate distribution of research 
benefits, rather than overinclusion and disproportionate distribution of burdens. 
I rely on basic intuitions of reciprocity and fair play as well as broader accounts 
of social and political equity to show that equity in burden distribution is a key aspect 
of the ethics of secondary research. To satisfy its demands, we can use three sets of 
regulatory and policy levers. First, information collection for public research should 
expand beyond groups having the lowest welfare. Next, data analyses and queries 
should draw on data pools more equitably. Finally, we must create an entity to 
coordinate these solutions using existing statutory authority if possible. Considering 
health information collection at a systematic level—rather than that of individual 
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clinical encounters—gives us insight into the broader role that health information 
plays in forming personhood, citizenship, and community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Medical research is undergoing its third paradigm shift of the last three 
centuries.1 Until the nineteenth century, research mostly occurred informally 
in the course of treating a patient and observing outcomes—a physician 
 
1 The approach I describe “highlights a historic shift in medical research and care . . . This type 
of study marks a shift not just in the way doctors treat patients but also in how they conduct long-
term medical research.” Steve Sternberg, The Precision Medicine Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (June 6, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-06/precision-med
icine-is-changing-the-nature-of-long-term-medical-research [https://perma.cc/9TK7-VDDY]. 
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learned by doing.2 Subsequently, the clinical trial became the staple of 
medical research in the twentieth century.3 The clinical trial remains 
important in the twenty-first century, but breakthroughs are increasingly 
coming from “informational” or “secondary” research. By this, I mean research 
that aggregates information about patients, including physical conditions, 
genetic information, treatments, responses, and outcomes.4 This type of 
research provides a real-world snapshot at a population-wide level in ways 
that are not possible with traditional clinical trials. Data from clinical contexts 
are fed back into databases in a “continuous feedback loop,” the analysis of 
which iteratively helps to improve clinical and health delivery outcomes.5 The 
goal is to create a national information network based on data collected from 
providers, payers, or patients by private or public entities. 
The collection of such information raises serious ethical concerns because 
it imposes special burdens on specific patients whose records form the data 
pool for queries and analyses. Even with the best protections, “[n]o security 
measures . . . can ever completely safeguard against . . . release of . . . or 
inappropriate use of information.”6 Patients therefore face the risk of 
 
2 See Emily A. Largent et al., Can Research and Care Be Ethically Integrated?, 41 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2011, at 37, 37 (describing the historical practice of carrying out research in 
the course of providing medical care). 
3 See Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 76 (2011) 
(recognizing that “randomized, controlled clinical trials . . . were the major workhorse of late 
twentieth-century biomedical discovery”). 
4 While my usage is standard, other scholars prefer different terms. See, e.g., SHARYL J. NASS 
ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: 
ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 19 & n.11 (2009) [hereinafter 
BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE] (“The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
has noted that the term ‘secondary uses’ of health data is ill defined and therefore urged abandoning 
it . . . .”). This Article is solely about secondary research based on data that is identifiable so that 
records about a single patient that were collected from multiple sources and at different points in 
time are linkable. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and 
Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 130 (2012) (describing a 
study that concluded that removing identifier elements from medical data in compliance with 
HIPAA’s “de-identifi[cation]” rules “reduced data by 31% and precluded access to information that 
is vitally important for research purposes”). The Article does not concern research on biospecimens 
or clinical trials. 
5 JOE ALPER & CLAUDIA GROSSMAN, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
INTEGRATING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE: HEALTH SYSTEM LEADERS WORKING TOWARD 
HIGH-VALUE CARE 13 (2015) [hereinafter INTEGRATING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE]. Here, I rely 
on the traditional Common Rule definition of research as “a systematic investigation, including 
research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2016). Thus, I envisage research as contributing to the social 
good, broadly defined. The definition of research is a complex subject involving academic dispute 
and discussion that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
        6  KATHY HUDSON ET AL., THE PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., PRECISION 
MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT PROGRAM—BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21st 
CENTURY MEDICINE 84 (2015), https://acd.od.nih.gov/reports/DRAFT-PMI-WG-Report-9-11-
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employment or insurance discrimination, reputational loss, or identity theft.7 
Individuals also have personal interests in their health information, whether 
identified or de-identified, much as they do with property.8 They suffer 
dignitary harm when this information is used without their consent. Further, 
surveillance of, and information collection from certain groups, can send 
certain social messages about them that affect their status. Finally, these 
harms, whether real or perceived, may reduce trust in the medical system 
generally, exacerbating health problems among those groups. 
The key problem is this: new regulations and laws increasingly facilitate 
the collection and public use of data of those on public benefit programs, 
namely, the poor and the elderly. By contrast, others who do not rely on public 
benefit programs can keep their information out of the communal pot while 
remaining well-positioned to enjoy the health benefits that follow as the 
learning health system gets off the ground. 
This Article argues that laws should distribute information burdens across 
society in a just manner.9 This entails taking into account the social welfare 
of the individual patient where possible when imposing information burdens. 
In concrete terms, this requires altering the points at which we collect 
information that is made publicly available, focusing less on public benefit 
programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and looking to other sources of data. 
We must also alter research methods by broadening and—where possible—
shifting, the public data pool that is queried for research. Many of the 
solutions that I offer can be realized through simple regulatory changes. I also 
offer statutory solutions, although recognizing that those may be far more 
difficult to achieve. 
Nonetheless, the law often, and with good reason, imposes different 
material, dignitary, and autonomy burdens on different groups. The Constitution 
and existing statutes provide little basis to suggest changes to how informational 
burdens are distributed. However, bioethical precepts, which have historically 
shaped research laws and regulations,10 require a more equitable burden 
allocation. Accordingly, this Article develops a framework grounded in bioethics 
to support health information equity. 
 
2015-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WHK-NWPU] [hereinafter THE PRECISION MEDICINE 
INITIATIVE]. The harms can range from reidentification to the misuse of one’s private information. 
7 See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1148 (2011) (noting the 
wide concern of privacy invasion leading to “adverse, real-world consequence[s]”); see also Craig 
Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 9) (on file with author) (“Privacy intrusions impose status harms on individuals at 
the time of the intrusion.”). 
8 See infra notes 109–31 and accompanying text. 
9 I note here that my critique is only of the laws as written. In practice, the effects of the law 
could be counteracted by other forces that are not yet predictable. 
10 See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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The ethics of health information research have largely been dominated by 
a single value—maintaining individual autonomy in clinical encounters—and 
offer mechanisms such as individual consent and privacy protections to 
preserve this autonomy.11 This approach offers little purchase for equity 
concerns. To be sure, bioethicists reminded us to distribute the burdens of 
research equitably a generation ago.12 But those admonishments were offered 
with little analysis. And in the years since, research ethics have undergone a 
“dramatic change.”13 Today, the field focuses almost exclusively on distributing 
the benefits of research and on questions of underinclusion of minorities—rather 
than overinclusion.14 
 
11 See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 
J.L.-MED. 65, 99-100 (2014) (describing the traditional autonomy-centered model of health 
information in which physicians are bound by a “duty of confidentiality in curating the[ir] patient’s 
health data”); Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 
385, 401 (2012) [hereinafter Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy] (defining health privacy exceptionalism 
as the idea that “health information deserves a higher level of privacy protection than most other 
types of data”); see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 4, at 91-94 (noting that many parties are 
interested in acquiring the sensitive and personal information from medical records); Sharona 
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic 
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 339 (2007) (listing the requirements of the HIPAA 
Security Rule for covered entities, which include “protect[ing] [health] data against reasonably 
anticipated threats to its security”); Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to 
Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1497-99 (2002) (recognizing that medical records are 
“highly protected” under HIPAA and that privacy is a fundamental value to the health care 
enterprise); Nicolas P. Terry, Electronic Health Records: International, Structural and Legal Perspectives, 
12 J.L. & MED. 26, 29 (2004) (explaining that “patient interests in confidentiality, privacy and 
anonymity” generate tensions “between the key stakeholders and their needs” in the health 
information technology domain); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and 
Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 689-90 (describing the 
Australian HealthConnect system, which “allows the patient (in consultation with the physician) to 
control what data are included and who may view it”). 
12 See Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192, 23,194 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter 
Belmont Report] (naming “justice” as a basic ethical principle particularly relevant to the ethics of 
research of human subjects and explaining that “an injustice occurs . . . when some burden is 
imposed unduly”). 
13 Patricia A. King, Justice Beyond Belmont, in BELMONT REVISITED: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
FOR RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 136, 136 (James F. Childress et al. eds., 2005). 
14 Indeed, scholars suggest that the key problem is that low-income populations are 
underincluded in databases. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 55, 56 (2013) (“[T]he reality is that billions of people remain on its margins because they 
do not routinely engage in activities that big data and advanced analytics are designed to capture.”); 
Sarah E. Malanga et al., Big Data Neglects Populations Most in Need of Medical and Public Health 
Research and Interventions (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 16-26) in BIG DATA, HEALTH 
LAW, AND BIOETHICS (H.F. Lynch et al. eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828954## (arguing that underserved communities, such as 
racial and ethnic minorities, have been excluded from many data sets and warning that such exclusion 
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Reclaiming equity requires us to assess the obligations the players within 
the system can place on each other.15 I first consider these obligations as if the 
health information system were a closed world. There, simple, intuitive 
norms of reciprocity require a greater degree of equity. The overwhelming 
majority of individuals will benefit from health information over their 
lifetimes. To conscript the information of and impose material, dignitary, and 
status harms on only one group undermines fundamental notions of fair play. 
But the health information system is also embedded in a larger set of 
social and political institutions against which these equity values should be 
tested. Different approaches to these broader institutions apply different 
values and obligations throughout society. These society-wide prescriptions 
may influence the obligations within particular systems, including that of 
health information. I thus take more complex, but nonetheless widely shared 
intuitions as given: that the poor and elderly deserve assistance, that in 
existing society, the poor and perhaps, the elderly, do not receive the level of 
assistance they deserve, and that addressing health information burdens will 
alleviate some of these other social harms. I recognize though, that not 
everyone shares these theories of obligation. But this is not the place to 
defend them at length. I simply show how altering each of my premises affects 
my claims about equity to different degrees. 
Part I lays out how new laws and policies are facilitating the disproportionate 
collection and public use of data. Part II details the kinds of burdens such practices 
can impose. Part III provides an ethical framework to assess these inequities. Part 
IV then shows what regulatory and statutory levers can be used to render 
secondary research more equitable. 
Finally, I emphasize that this Article does not address the question of 
whether we should collect information—a question which already dominates 
the information ethics literature.16 Rather, it accepts as a premise that it is 
 
limits the extent to which health research will benefit these groups). In doing so, they do not mention 
many of the developments that I discuss in this Article. 
15 I assume here that identifying “obligations” justifies government coercion of individuals into 
complying with those obligations. 
16 A prominent line of research ethics argues that there is an obligation to participate in 
research. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in Biomedical Research?, 6 
IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Sept./Oct. 1984, at 1, 3 (suggesting that those who benefit from 
research have an obligation to participate in research); John Harris, Scientific Research Is a Moral 
Duty, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 242, 242 (2005) (citing two principles, “do no harm” and “fairness,” as the 
sources of a “powerful obligation to pursue, support, and participate in scientific research” 
(capitalization omitted)). Even assuming such a duty, questions would still remain about the extent 
of that duty, and privacy ethicists argue for—and the law recognizes—various kinds of limitations. 
See Craig Konnoth, Classification Standards for Health Information: Ethical and Practical Approaches, 72 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 395, 404 (2016) (proposing “a more calibrated breadth of consent” 
in which individuals consent to their information being used “only for research that departs from 
the original context of collection [to] a certain [extent],” as distinct from the current “all-or-nothing 
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valid to collect health information to serve the numerous goals of the health 
information system. Notwithstanding that premise, we must adopt a 
framework within which to reorganize privacy risk in ways that are ethical 
and just. Where bioethics has sought only to incorporate autonomy concerns 
in health data collection, this framework provides a guide for moving beyond 
autonomy to equity concerns. 
I. INEQUITY IN HEALTH INFORMATION COLLECTION 
The benefits of secondary research promise to be numerous. Agglomerating 
health records has enabled researchers to identify genetic mutations that 
indicate a high risk of breast cancer or Alzheimer’s,17 make changes to drug 
choice and administration,18 and develop quality and cost control measures.19 
Secondary research promises to battle discrimination and stigma of certain kinds 
by revealing health care disparities across populations and the prevalence of 
certain conditions.20 It facilitates recruitment for clinical trials21 and enables other 
 
approach . . . [to] provide broad consent for all further research”). But see W. Lipworth et al., Consent 
in Crisis: The Need to Reconceptualize Consent to Tissue Banking Research, 36 INTERNAL MED. J. 124, 
125 (2006) (noting that more stringent consent requirements may prove to be a burden on 
researchers by “creat[ing] an untenable workload and reduc[ing] sample sizes”). 
17 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) 
(explaining that Myriad Genetics “found the location of a gene associated with increased risk of 
breast cancer and identified mutations of that gene that increase the risk”); Alzheimer’s Genes: Are 
You at Risk?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/in-
depth/alzheimers-genes/art-20046552 [https://perma.cc/XU6C-5ZAK] (“Researchers have identified 
a number of genes associated with Alzheimer’s disease.”). For a longer list of genetic diagnoses, see 
Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV 
1765, 1780 (2010), which discusses mutations that contraindicate the use of the popular blood thinner, 
warfarin, and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, GENESIS GENETICS, http://genesisgenetics.org/
pgd/ [https://perma.cc/V3ZB-CBXA]. 
18 See Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and Future Drug Development and Delivery, 355 LANCET 
1358, 1358 (2000) (discussing the role of genetic information in medication decisions). 
19 See, e.g., ALEX PENTLAND, TODD G. REID & TRACY HEIBECK, BIG DATA AND HEALTH: 
REVOLUTIONIZING MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 31 (2013) (stating that readmissions 
correlated with mental depression in Washington D.C. hospitals); id. at 30 (analyzing unnecessary 
prescriptions of expensive brand name medication); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information: 
Reconciling Personal Privacy with the Public Good of Human Health, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 321, 
322 (2001) (advocating for the collection of health data for, among other things, the facilitation of 
cost-effective assessment). 
20 See Gregory E. Simon et al., Large Medical Databases, Population-Based Research, and Patient 
Confidentiality, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1731, 1732 (2000) (“Data documenting adverse effects of older 
antidepressant drugs and long-acting sedative-hypnotic drugs have informed efforts to improve the 
quality of psychotropic drug prescribing for older adults . . . .”). 
21 See Tracy Stuardi, Helen Cox & David J. Torgerson, Database Recruitment: A Solution to Poor 
Recruitment in Randomized Trials?, 28 FAM. PRAC. 329, 330 (2010) (discussing the advantages of 
database recruitment for randomized controlled trials).  
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means of research when trials are not possible.22 Over the summer of 2016, 
the then–National Coordinator for Health Information Technology observed 
at an internal medicine research review session that “5 out of 6 [studies] used 
[electronic health record] data.”23 Another study finds that three-fifths of 
clinical trials use some form of digital health information.24 
Only some health data makes it into secondary research because not all 
individuals go to the doctor—either because they are healthy or because they 
cannot afford health care (but are not poor enough to receive Medicaid).25 A 
doctor may also fail to enter information into a health record or transmit 
gathered data. 
The data that is captured and used are of two main varieties. First, there 
is claims data that providers transfer to payers to receive reimbursement. This 
includes diagnostic and procedure codes.26 Next, there is electronic health or 
medical record (EHR) data. While claims data only contains information about 
a provider’s conclusions (i.e., her diagnoses) and treatment procedures,27 the 
EHR contains the information on which the conclusion was based—such as 
symptoms, behavior, and even genetic information.28 Claims data is mainly 
used to assess health care delivery, cost and utilization, and sometimes, quality 
 
22 See generally Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the Inferential Gap: The Electronic Health Record 
and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. w181 (2007) (explaining various shortcomings of randomized 
control trials, including that they are too selective and ignore comorbidities, and noting that 
secondary research helps to bridge the gap). 
23 Darius Tahir, Inspector General on DOD/Cerner Implementation, POLITICO (June 2, 2016, 10:00 
AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/06/inspector-general-on-dod-cerner-
implementation-onc-transparency-site-tiff-desalvo-on-pulse-check-214610 [https://perma.cc/YU8M-
XNTY] (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 See Validic, Validic Reveals Findings from 2016 Global Pharma and Biotech Survey on Digital 
Health, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:16 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/vali
dic-reveals-findings-from-2016-global-pharma-and-biotech-survey-on-digital-health-300330012.html 
[https://perma.cc/9A5Q-XK54] (“According to survey results, over 60 percent of respondents stated 
that they have used digital health technologies in clinical trials . . . .”). 
25 See JOHN WILSON & ADAM BOCK, OPTUM THE BENEFIT OF USING BOTH CLAIMS 
DATA AND ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD DATA IN HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 4 (2014), 
https://www.optum.com/content/dam/optum/resources/whitePapers/Benefits-of-using-both-
claims-and-EMR-data-in-HC-analysis-WhitePaper-ACS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XHJ-MLKP] 
(explaining that “uninsured patients have no source of claim data”). 
26 See HCPCS-General Information, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/coding/
medhcpcsgeninfo/index.html [https://perma.cc/63AV-A4PR] (providing background information 
about the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) that health insurance providers 
use to process claims). 
27 Id. 
28 Electronic Health Records, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/E-health/EHealthRecords/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8LQ4-MMMB] (last updated Mar. 26, 2012). As one doctor notes, 
“Whew! We think the ICD-10 [diagnostic] coding hierarchy is complex—it’s nothing compared to 
[the EHR coding mechanism] SNOMED-CT.” Eden Ware, SNOMED: What It Is and Why It Was Added 
to Stage 2 Meaningful Use, HEALTH LANGUAGE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://blog.healthlanguage.com/SNOMED-
What-it-is-and-Why-it-was-Added-to-Stage-2-Meaningful-Use [https://perma.cc/94E5-NHLF]. 
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of care.29 It is less frequently used for clinical research. EHR data, on the 
other hand, is far more granular and time-limited, and can therefore be used 
for clinical research. 
Both kinds of data can come from many sources. For example, patients 
can voluntarily provide their information to research networks. Alternatively, 
payers and providers, both public and private, can collect data and analyze it 
themselves or pass it on to other entities for analysis. Laws and policies have 
made data from public programs progressively more attractive and available 
for public research, while private data is increasingly harder to aggregate. 
Although public programs historically made claims data publicly available 
for research, they did not collect EHR data. This meant that those seeking 
EHR data needed to rely on difficult-to-access private sources. However, 
public programs are ramping up EHR data collection. These changes are 
coinciding with increased enrollment in public programs and increased access 
to data—sometimes including names and social security numbers. On the 
other hand, the data of other individuals is being left outside the publicly 
available information pot. 
A. Low-Income and Elderly Individuals 
Data collection policies affecting low-income and elderly individuals are 
increasingly being determined by the convergence of two processes.30 First, 
more and more data is being collected from individuals in public benefits 
programs who tend to be poorer, older, and in worse health.31 For example, 
within the last two years, the granularity of diagnostic codes—and therefore 
the details about beneficiaries’ illnesses—has increased by more than a factor 
of seven.32 Further, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
 
29 WILSON & BOCK, supra note 25, at 3. 
30 Medicaid includes only the poorest individuals. Those below 100% of the poverty threshold 
have the lowest rates of insurance coverage while those at or above 400% have the highest rates. 
Jessica C. Smith & Carla Medalia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 13 (2015). 
31 See Gretchen Jacobson et al., Income and Assets of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2014–2030, HENRY 
J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/income-and-assets-of-
medicare-beneficiaries-2014-2030 [https://perma.cc/L9PX-C4C7] (compiling financial data for 
Medicare beneficiaries and finding that “most are of modest means”). Moreover, the health of the 
elderly tends to be worse. Furthermore, Medicaid is, of course, a means-tested program and 
Medicaid recipients are in “poorer health” than the privately insured. Julia Paradise & Rachel 
Garfield, What Is Medicaid’s Impact on Access to Care, Health Outcomes, and Quality of Care? Setting the 
Record Straight on the Evidence, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://kff.org/report-
section/what-is-medicaids-impact-on-access-to-care-health-outcomes-and-quality-of-care-setting-
the-record-straight-on-the-evidence-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/GX2P-KC96]. 
32 The ICD-9 coding system, used until 2015, had under 20,000 unique codes. However, 
reporting parameters are becoming more granular. ICD-10, adopted in 2015, allows the reporting of 
close to 150,000 distinct codes. See International Classification of Diseases, (ICD-10-CM/PCS) Transition-
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now mandates the use of electronic health records.33 EHRs include data about 
clinical and physiological symptoms, as well as family, medical, environmental, 
and social details, including information about diet, employment, exercise, and 
alcohol habits.34 Providers must also transmit certain aggregate measures to 
centralized registries based on this data,35 with more granularity over time.36 
Additionally, the Affordable Care Act ensures that all of this data is collected 
from more individuals: in 2015, eleven million additional individuals became 
eligible for Medicaid.37 
Next, new policies offer “unprecedented” data access and concomitant risk.38 
Although Medicare and Medicaid claims data has long been available for public 
 
Background, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd10cm_pcs_background.htm [https://perma.cc/86SA-
FEBM] (last updated Oct. 1, 2015). ICD-10 also provides an opportunity to capture much greater 
specificity about the nature of a patient’s condition, which makes it more useful for research. See 
JOSEPH C. NICHOLS, HEALTH DATA CONSULTING, DATA VALUE: BREAKING OLD HABITS 4 
(2016), http://pages.himss.org/WZ0nIVLkG0t3WRg00k1WQ00 [https://perma.cc/7X3A-PH87] (“ICD-
10 provides the ability to collect even greater detail about the location and type of breast cancer.”). 
33 See EHR Incentive Payment Timeline, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-
professionals/ehr-incentive-payment-timeline [https://perma.cc/S47K-GMT5] (last updated Mar. 
4, 2014) (“Financial penalties are scheduled to take effect in 2015 for Medicare and Medicaid 
providers who did not transition to EHRs.”). Despite rumors, the fundamentals of the program 
remain despite recent regulatory changes. Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, 
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.
html?redirect=/ehrincentiveprograms [https://perma.cc/H23Z-YMSU] (last updated Feb. 8, 2017). As this 
Article goes to press, the public fate of these programs under the Trump Administration remains in limbo. 
34 A list of many of these variables in standardized format can be sought in the SNOMED 
library at SNOMED International SNOMED CT Browser, SNOMED CT, http://browser.ihtsdotools.org/?
perspective=full&conceptId1=404684003&edition=en-edition&release=v20170131&server=http://browser.
ihtsdotools.org/api/snomed&langRefset=900000000000509007 [https://perma.cc/ED72-PSCZ]. 
35 See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 
3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,762, 62,818 (Oct. 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 495) (announcing a modified reporting requirement 
concerning the reporting of electronic public health data to clinical data registries). 
36 Clinical Quality Measures (CQMs) usually require reporting of (patients with a certain 
condition) / (all patients in certain demographic or clinical group). eCQM Library, CMS.GOV (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
eCQM_Library.html [https://perma.cc/H6W5-X4QN]. 
37 Robin Rudowitz et al., What Coverage and Financing Is at Risk Under a Repeal of the ACA Medicaid 
Expansion, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/what-coverage-and-
financing-at-risk-under-repeal-of-aca-medicaid-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/WCU8-MDM4]. 
38 See Ben Moscovitch et al., Time to Fix the Black Hole in Medicare Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(June 29, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/29/time-to-fix-the-black-hole-in-medicare-
data/ [https://perma.cc/2LTR-JTB3] (discussing CMS’s new initiative giving patients, manufacturers, and 
researchers access to information from health insurance claims forms). 
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research,39 access has been limited. Files with patient identifiers exclude names 
and social security numbers,40 and numerous security measures are in place.41 
But CMS has opened up data access—from ten datasets that were publicly 
available in 2009 to more than 2100 datasets in 2016.42 Likewise, where data 
release was previously discretionary, the Affordable Care Act now mandates 
such data reporting to the newly created Patient Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute to improve clinical and health quality outcomes.43 The Institute has 
shown a keen interest in secondary research and data collection from patients and 
provider networks, including clinical, genetic, social/behavioral, and demographic 
information.44 However, the only guaranteed, mandated source of data comes from 
CMS. Once CMS’s EHR data collection initiative is completed, it will be a boon 
for the Institute’s programs. The Institute, in turn, is required to disseminate its 
research findings for general public use.45 Recent legislation and policy have further 
 
39 The data is made available under 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)–(b) (2012), which authorizes the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to release the data pursuant to regulation. The 
Privacy Act of 1974 requires statements of routine uses of the data in the system to be published. 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (2012). HHS has issued the appropriate statements with respect to its 
various data repositories. One of the routine uses includes “facilitat[ing] research on the quality and 
effectiveness of care provided.” Privacy Act of 1974; Report of a Modified or Altered System of 
Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 67,137, 67,137 (proposed Nov. 20, 2006); see also Systems of Records, CMS.GOV, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/PrivacyActSystemofRecords/Systems-
of-Records.html# [https://perma.cc/N443-KG2H] (last updated Mar. 2, 2013) (providing a list of 
“CMS’s Systems of Records (SOR) as published in the Federal Register”). 
40 See Difference Between RIF, LDS, and PUF Data Files, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/
resconnect/articles/148 [https://perma.cc/3PSU-MTC4] (last updated Aug. 10, 2016) (explaining 
that files categorized as “Research identifiable files” (RIFs) exclude certain information so as to 
protect the individual’s privacy). For an example of a state program that also makes Medicaid data 
available, see Accessing DHCS Protected Data for Research and Public Health, CAL. DEP’T HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES, http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/data/pages/accessingprotecteddata.aspx [https://
perma.cc/CM8F-EPYD] (last updated Mar. 15, 2017). 
41 See Research Identifiable Files (RIF) Requests, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/
request/research-identifiable-files [https://perma.cc/7PSE-BFG2] (noting that CMS’s Privacy 
Board reviews all requests for RIFs). 
42 Susannah Fox, Health Datapalooza: New Vistas, HHS IDEA LAB, (May 20, 2016), 
http://www.hhs.gov/blog/2016/05/20/health-datapalooza-new-vistas.html [https://perma.cc/9XTW-8RLU]. 
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(3)(A) (“The Secretary shall . . . make available to the Institute 
such data collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services . . . .”). See infra text 
accompanying notes 263–68 for further discussion of the Institute. 
44 In 2014, the Institute developed PCORnet, which consists of thirty-three large private 
clinical networks or health systems and patient networks that have already built themselves to 
existing capacity. The grants it distributes to enhance collection and coordination are often awarded 
only where there is already existing stakeholder support and technological infrastructure. About 
PCORnet, PCORNET, http://www.pcornet.org/about-pcornet/ [https://perma.cc/9VM5-C3KL] 
(last updated Mar. 7, 2017). 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(8)(A) (“The Institute shall, not later than 90 days after the conduct 
or receipt of research findings under this part, make such research findings available to clinicians, 
patients, and the general public.”). 
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spurred dissemination. As of last year, CMS has started releasing identifiable data 
to commercial companies under its new “Innovator” program.46 
The ACA and subsequent 2015 legislation expand access by limiting 
discretion and requiring CMS to give individual Medicare data to additional 
qualified entities.47 Under the 2015 program, CMS has stated it will release 
100% of beneficiary data provided the qualified entity is able to leverage and 
show use for it.48 This data also includes names and social security 
information.49 The program incentivizes greater amounts of data 
transmission than first meet the eye: qualified entities will only receive data 
if they have obtained data from other sources.50 They may also constitute a 
network of organizations rather than a single organization.51 Entities can 
access the data for as long as they are part of the program.52 The qualified 
entities may release or sell information, including patient names, to suppliers that 
have a treatment relationship with the patient or to suppliers that dispute any 
 
46 See Telephone Interview with Waruiru Mburu, Tech. Advisor, ResDAC, (July 6, 2016); see 
also Innovator Research, RESDAC, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/request/innovator-research 
[https://perma.cc/C7LH-3KBX] (“Innovators and entrepreneurs may now access CMS data as part 
of a research study to create products or tools that they intend to sell or to conduct research that 
creates analyses related to their own business needs.”). Until last year, only limited data sets would 
be released to these companies. Telephone Interview, supra. Admittedly, unlike other data transmissions, 
the Innovator program requires companies to analyze the data using a CMS portal. Id. 
47 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 105, 129 Stat. 
87, 133. Most of these changes were put in place to help reform payment methodologies. Indeed, the 
Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) has been referred to as possibly “the second 
most important law to reform the United States’ health care system after the Social Security 
Amendments which created Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.” Niam Yaraghi, MACRA Proposed Rule 
Creates More Problems than It Solves, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2016/10/12/macra-proposed-rule-creates-more-problems-than-it-solves/ [https://perma.cc/7JBS-RZJY]. 
48 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 76,542, 76,552 (Dec. 7, 2011).  
49 See id. at 76,551 (explaining that all claims provided to qualified entities will contain a unique 
and encrypted beneficiary identification number). Encryption, it should be noted, consists only of 
removing “direct identif[iers]” like name, address, and phone number. Id. at 76,567; see also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 401.703(f)–(g) (2012) (describing the same). 
50 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed 
Reg. at 76,545-46. CMS has declined to provide a fixed threshold on how much outside data is 
desirable. Instead, qualified entities are incentivized to maximize data collection. Medicare Program: 
Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed. Reg. 5397, 5399 (proposed Feb. 2, 
2016). The recent regulation now seeks to “encourage issuers to submit data . . . to . . . increas[e] . . . 
sample size.” Id. 
51 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
76,543. Further, CMS declined to limit qualified entity status to nonprofits and governmental bodies, 
opening it up to commercial organizations as well. Id. at 76,544. 
52 See id. at 76,559 (requiring that “once an entity voluntarily leaves or is involuntarily 
terminated from the program it must destroy or return all CMS data provided . . . within 30 days”). 
However, they can reapply every three years. Id. at 76,568. 
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performance metric that the qualified entity calculates.53 CMS encourages this 
kind of data sharing.54 
Because only claims data is currently collected, the nature of the research 
projects are limited. However, as its EHR data collection program is 
completed, CMS data sources will drive additional forms of clinical research 
that now use private data.55 Indeed, the National Academies have called on 
CMS to “identify or develop and validate measurement standards for 
collection of [yet even] new social risk factors.”56 
B. The Privately Insured 
Private data collection involves a great variety of configurations. Private 
networks have proprietary databases managed by research subdivisions or 
outside research entities.57 In spite of innovative uses of data in private 
networks, there are three key differences from CMS data policies. First, 
although it is difficult to determine how much proprietary research private 
entities carry out, anecdotes and conversations suggest that many, if not most, 
private entities do not even engage in internal research. Rather, they use the 
 
53 See Medicare Program: Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 5415 (allowing disclosure regarding information about a supplier’s patients). However, CMS 
also explains that before releasing either a public or nonpublic analysis, a qualified entity must 
inform providers and suppliers of information. Id. at 5399. Suppliers might seek any identifiable 
claims data (including names) that are “relevant to the particular measure or measure result” in 
dispute. 42 C.F.R. § 401.717(c) (2013). This might potentially permit release of non-patient names 
if non-patient information went into creating the particular measure. 
54 See Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 76,558 (“We encouraged qualified entities to share this data with providers or supplies 
upon request.”). 
55 Part of the problem is that many entities were unable to determine where to transmit data. 
However, in September 2016, CMS confirmed that it is continuing the task of building a list of 
public health agencies and clinical data registries that can receive electronic public health measures 
under new meaningful use reporting requirements. See CMS to Develop Data Repository for Clinical 
Data Registry Reporting, HIT CONSULTANT (Sept. 20, 2016), http://hitconsultant.net/2016/09/20/
cms-to-develop-clinical-data-registry/ [https://perma.cc/J6NK-X2T4] (announcing CMS plans to 
develop a centralized data repository to support sharing public health data). 
56 THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G., & MED., ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL RISK 
FACTORS IN MEDICARE PAYMENT 26 (2016). CMS is regularly asked to release additional data. 
For example, last year, House Ways and Means Committee leaders of both parties called on CMS 
to release more data regarding the mental and behavioral health of Medicare patients in keeping 
with CMS’s recent open data efforts, such as data on anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, personality 
disorders, and traumatic brain injury. See Letter from Representative Kevin Brady et al., to Andrew 
Slavitt, Acting Adm’r., CMS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://goo.gl/KgEiAL [https://perma.cc/EQ47-MB52] 
[hereinafter Brady Letter].  
57 See, e.g., Epidemiology and Health Services Research Center, GEISINGER CARING, https://www.
geisinger.edu/en/research/departments-and-centers/epidemiology-and-health-services-research-center 
[https://perma.cc/3VW2-SWEA] (providing an example of such a subdivision). 
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data to provide continuous care as patients circulate among various providers 
in the network. 
Second, even if data is used for internal research to benefit plan members, 
the research is not generally made publicly available. As the Director for 
Informatics Research at a prominent medical system explained to me in a 
confidential email, CMS makes its data public because “[t]hey need to show” 
Congress and others “that they are doing good things, which is why they . . . 
are making the data available.” But private entities are known for seeking to 
maintain data monopolies.58 As my source explains, “The data has a certain 
amount of inherent wealth. The recipient of the data will . . . benefit from 
using [or] publishing on the data. If something goes wrong then [private 
entities] (and to a certain extent the recipient [or] secondary user of the data) 
will be held accountable.” Thus, there is no reason to “give the data to a 
competitor who gets the accolades, the grants, [or] a competitive advantage.”59 
As two prominent research scientists argue, this results in private, siloed “war 
chests of data,” which these entities “enter . . . into systems that are already 
optimized (primarily for advertising) to make predictions about individuals.”60 
This makes it harder to agglomerate private data for clinical research. 
Finally, in the rare cases in which data is passed on to collaborators and 
outsiders, unlike CMS data, the data is always stripped of all key identifiers.61 
This means that the risk of identification is lessened. 
To be sure, until last year, efforts were well underway in some states to 
ensure access to the claims information of the privately insured. Almost 
twenty states have all-payer claims databases (APCDs) in place, which 
require insurers to send data to central state databases for further analysis.62 
Such databases have historically been the largest source of private claims data 
 
58 For example, Myriad has the breast cancer gene sequence for thousands of variants, but 
unlike other laboratories, it refuses to share it with ClinVar, the government database of disease-
related gene sequences. Erika Check Hayden, Myriad Genetics Embroiled in Breast-Cancer Data 
Fight—Again, NATURE (May 20, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/myriad-genetics-embroiled-
in-breast-cancer-data-fight-again-1.19953 [https://perma.cc/V22K-ANZL]. 
59 Id. An example of this is athenahealth’s attempts to address the Zika virus. Athena advertised 
how it tracked medical records to track patients who may have the virus. Press Release, 
Athenahealth, Athenahealth Partners with Affected Florida Community to Combat Zika Virus (Aug. 
3, 2016), http://newsroom.athenahealth.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253091&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2192379 
[https://perma.cc/Z9YQ-DGL7]. But it never actually shared the data with public entities or made 
it available for research—that would diminish its advantage. 
60 John T. Wilbanks & Eric J. Topol, Stop the Privatization of Health Data, NATURE (July 29, 2016), 
http://www.nature.com/news/stop-the-privatization-of-health-data-1.20268 [https://perma.cc/NW2A-LYJF]. 
61  As mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
data is generally only shared if eighteen identifiers are stripped, but limited data sets can be shared 
with appropriate agreements in place. See 42 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)–(R) (2011) (listing the 
types of identifying information that must be removed under HIPAA). Moreover, entities can hire 
a data scientist to certify that the risk of reidentification is minimal. Id. § 164.514(b)(1). 
62 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 941 (2016). 
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for research.63 States used these databases for research, but also sold de-
identified data for commercial purposes to fund these all-payer efforts.64 
However, in 2016, the Supreme Court held that the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted states from mandatorily 
collecting claims data from self-funded plans.65 With this decision, the Court 
“bl[e]w an enormous hole in the all-payer claims databases” as two-thirds of 
all employees are self-insured.66 In July, the Department of Labor issued 
proposals for information collection, but “it is hard to see that the information 
[it] proposes to collect . . . would be an adequate substitute for the all-payer 
claims database information.”67 
C. High-Income Individuals 
Finally, those who are wealthier, healthier, or younger—characteristics 
which often go together68—are less likely to have health data in the publicly 
 
63 See Sean E. Bland et al., Strategies for Health System Innovation After Gobeille v Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 581, 581 (2016) (“Over the past decade, many states 
have used APCDs to capture new and more sophisticated insurance claims and utilization data . . . .”). 
64 See Resources: Frequently Asked Questions, APCD COUNCIL, https://www.apcdcouncil.org/
frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/23M6-C6TV] (“Agencies with laws and policies that 
permit the release of standard de-identified and research APCD analytic files can generate revenues from the 
sales of these products, with the appropriate release agreements and research review approvals.”). 
65 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947. 
66 Nicholas Bagley, The Supreme Court’s Wrongheaded Decision in Gobeille, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-supreme-
courts-wrongheaded-decision-in-gobeille/ [https://perma.cc/JKH5-LUP2]. This is the majority 
view. See e.g., Bland et al., supra note 63 (arguing that the Gobeille decision “may undermine 
opportunities for health system innovation” and proposing solutions to address the problem). But a 
minority view suggests that the decision may not be so fatal. See David Newman et al., Losing the 
‘All’ In All-Payer Claims Databases, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2016/07/18/losing-the-all-in-all-payer-claims-databases/ [https://perma.cc/44WR-S6Z4] (“While we 
understand that the potential loss of ERISA data is viewed with concern . . . , the Court’s decision 
may not be fatal to policy-relevant research.”). 
67 Tim Jost, Labor, IRS Propose New Health Plan Reporting Requirements; CMS Makes Its Case on 
Cost Sharing (July 12, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/12/labor-irs-propose-new-health-
plan-reporting-requirements-cms-makes-its-case-on-cost-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/WLZ8-KWUU]; 
see also Annual Reporting and Disclosure, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,496, 47,499-47,500 (proposed July 21, 
2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2520, 2590) (proposing to expand reporting requirements by 
“eliminating obsolete exemptions for certain plans”). In defense of Labor, while they sought 
comment on how new data collection requirements related to Gobeille, the data collection was likely 
planned before Gobeille, and thus sought only to satisfy Labor’s specific mandate under the 
Affordable Care Act for quality improvement efforts of health plans. Id. at 47,528 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1185(d) (2012)). 
68 Young people tend to be poorer than rich people. But young people who are healthier tend 
to be wealthier, and healthier people, holding age constant, tend to be rich. See STEVEN H. WOOLF 
ET AL., URBAN INST., & CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH, HOW ARE INCOME AND WEALTH LINKED 
TO HEALTH AND LONGEVITY? 1 fig.1 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/
publication-pdfs/2000178-How-are-Income-and-Wealth-Linked-to-Health-and-Longevity.pdf 
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available information pot. As of September 2013, pursuant to regulatory 
changes, a provider must comply with a patient’s request not to disclose 
information to health plans if the patient pays for the service out of pocket.69  
Although the law contemplates that patients can prevent doctors from 
disclosing data only to health plans, there is reason to think that some 
providers could simply omit the data from the health record where possible. 
In its overview of the comments to the 2013 rule, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) acknowledged that providers found the new 
requirement burdensome as they would “hav[e] to . . . manually redact 
information from the medical record” or even “create separate records” prior 
to an audit—when an insurer can access most provider files.70 HHS provided 
no real guidance to address this concern, suggesting only that providers adopt 
data minimization techniques.71 Thus, where providers are not required to 
retain information by law or treatment standards, the simplest way to avoid 
having to segregate records to guard against inadvertent disclosure and 
HIPAA liability is to omit recording information altogether. 
But the truly rich do not need the benefit of HIPAA rules. Many of the 
richest individuals rely on “concierge medicine.” According to a recent profile, 
one such practice has a highly limited number of patients, each of whom pays 
$25,000 a year 
for unfettered access to the doctors. Patients will be able to call and see and 
text the doctors whenever they want; they will be able to receive home visits 
. . . . They will be able to ask their doctors to travel to them should they 
suspect the onset of illness in June in Umbria.72 
 
[https://perma.cc/S7HB-EAZY] (tracking the likelihood of death and disease relative to economic 
standing). 
69 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(vi) (2013); see also Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, 
Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other 
Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5624 (Jan. 25, 2013) (adopting a final rule 
that “restrict[s] certain disclosures of protected health information to a health plan where the 
individual pays out of pocket in full for the health care item or service”). 
70 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules 
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5627. 
71 See id. at 5628 (explaining that providers should already “have in place . . . minimum 
necessary policies and procedures, which require limiting the protected health information disclosed 
to a health plan”). 
72 Ginia Bellafante, Enhanced Medical Care for an Annual Fee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/nyregion/enhanced-medical-care-for-an-annual-fee.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/A26Y-HZ72]. 
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As of 2008, there were twenty-eight concierge doctors in the New York 
metropolitan area, and by 2013, there were 124.73 That number may continue 
to grow.74 
Finally, because nearly all health information comes from providers, those 
who do not need to go to providers remain completely insulated from the 
collection system. These individuals skew comparatively healthy, wealthy, and 
young.75 They can rely on wearable devices like FitBits or, increasingly, 
wellness programs, to monitor their health without ever seeing a provider.76 
Nonetheless, their data is necessary to develop controls for research involving 
illness, including information about normal variation,77 and asymptomatic 
versions of certain conditions.78 
II. THE BURDENS OF HEALTH INFORMATION COLLECTION 
Understanding the need for equity in health information collection 
requires appreciating its burdens. Health information collection, storage, and 
 
73 Id. 
74 See id. (“The risk of course is that these sort of practices multiply . . . .”). 
75 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS: 
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2014 tbl.A-18a (undated), http://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/
Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2014_SHS_Table_A-18.pdf  [https://perma.cc/MY7F-MSL8]  
[hereinafter CDC  STATISTICS]. As the data reveals, younger individuals tend to have less contact 
with medical professionals. Id. Holding age constant, individuals with private insurance visit the 
doctor less frequently than CMS populations. Id. This is likely—at least in part—due to the fact that 
they are healthier. See Paradise & Garfield, supra note 31 (“Medicaid beneficiaries are poorer and have a 
poorer health profile compared with both the privately insured and the uninsured.”). 
76 See Nick Bilton, Where Wearable Technology Ends Up (Hint: Not Your Wrist), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/style/where-wearable-technology-ends-up-hint-not-
your-wrist.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D42E-W8A4] (describing the wearable fitness tracker 
industry as a multi-billion dollar industry, albeit one in decline). 
77 See Adeline R. Whitney et al., Individuality and Variation in Gene Expression Patterns in Human 
Blood, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 1896, 1900-01 (2003) (using data from healthy individuals 
to determine normal variation in gene expression). In fact, a 2012 survey of “6200 doctors, nurses, 
lay people, and legislators in Finland found wide disagreement over whether dozens of so-called ‘states 
of being’ should even be considered diseases, including ADHD and overactive bladder.” John Fauber et al., 
Lowering the Bar: Medicine in the 21st Century, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 22, 2016), http://www.medpage
today.com/special-reports/LoweringtheBar/58048 [https://perma.cc/6QAH-SQXD]. 
78 Admittedly data from sicker patients is still thought to be more useful. Thus, records of sick 
patients contain more information than those of healthy patients. See Nicole G. Weiskopf et al., Sick 
Patients Have More Data: The Non-Random Completeness of Electronic Health Records, 2013 AMIA ANN. 
SYMP. PROC. 1472, 1476 (“Sicker patients tend to have more complete records and healthier patients 
tend to have records that are less complete.”). But healthy individuals’ information is increasingly 
being used for various purposes, including—for example, trying to understand what sickness itself 
is. See Hans K. Meier-Ewert et al., Absence of Diurnal Variation of C-Reactive Protein Concentrations 
in Healthy Human Subjects, 47 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 426, 426 (2001) (noting that healthy subjects’ 
data can be used to predict future risk of myocardial infarction and stroke). See generally Carol 
Masheter et al., Making Cents of Utah’s Healthy Population, 1 UTAH ATLAS HEALTHCARE, Oct. 2010, 
at 1 (explaining Utah’s effort to collect information about healthy individuals). 
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use impose burdens—both material and autonomy based—on individuals.79 
This Part describes a range of burdens that an individual might suffer by 
having her data used. But imposing burdens is not, in itself, normatively 
unacceptable—we justify doing so in a range of cases. Thus, this Part is 
primarily descriptive in nature. 
A. Privacy and Security Harms 
Each act of data transmission presents some risk that data will be 
breached, even with security precautions in place. The frequency of breaches 
has increased.80 In 2015, 113 million electronic health records were breached.81 
Almost ninety percent of health care covered entities admitted to a patient 
data breach in the last two years.82 
Criminal attacks were the leading cause of these breaches, accounting for 
about half of them.83 Health care institutions are more vulnerable to these 
attacks.84 Hospital “hostage taking” has frequently made the news recently, 
where hackers have retained hospital data until they were paid sums of money.85 
 
79 This distinction between material burdens and autonomy-related burdens tracks the 
distinction in Calo, supra note 7, at 1133, between objective and subjective burdens. 
80 See PONEMON INST., SIXTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PRIVACY & SECURITY OF 
HEALTHCARE DATA 1 (2016) (discussing “the increased frequency of [data] breaches” in the health 
care industry). 
81 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-771, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH 
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION: HHS 
NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT 9 (2016), http://www.
gao.gov/assets/680/679260.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DCZ-SRAN]; see also id. at 13 (“[T]he magnitude of the 
threat against health care information has grown exponentially.”). Another group predicted that one in 
three health care recipients would be the victim of a medical data breach in 2016. Dan Munro, Data 
Breaches in Healthcare Totaled over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015, 9:11 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-million-
records-in-2015/#7c89ac677fd5 [https://perma.cc/2AJN-8SDK]. 
82 PONEMON INST., supra note 80, at 1. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 2. In fact, the health care industry led all industries with eighty-eight percent of all 
ransomware detected in the second quarter of 2016. SERT Quarterly Threat Report Q2 2016, NTT 
SECURITY (June 26, 2016), https://www.solutionary.com/threat-intelligence/threat-reports/quarterly-
threat-reports/sert-threat-report-q2-2016/ [https://perma.cc/95JP-RECR]. And a Brookings 
Institution study predicts that one in four data breaches this year will hit the health care industry. 
NIAM YARAGHI, BROOKINGS INST., HACKERS, PHISHERS, AND DISAPPEARING THUMB DRIVES: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MAJOR HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 1 (2016) (“Twenty-three 
percent of all data breaches happen in the health care industry.”). The FBI, similarly, anticipates 
rising cyber threats to health care. See Joseph Goedert, FBI Sees Rising Cyber Threats to Healthcare, 
HEALTH DATA MGMT. (July 13, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/fbi-
sees-rising-cyber-threats-to-healthcare-organizations [https://perma.cc/386V-Y7KJ] (“The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation sees increasing presence from hackers trying to access patient information 
from providers.”). 
85 See e.g., Jeff Stone, Ransomware Hackers a Bigger Threat than Ever, Forcing Hospitals and Police 
to Pay Hostage Fees, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
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This has led to discussions among members of the cybersecurity community 
and in Congress to increase hospital data security standards.86 Health care 
institutions report that they are the least prepared to deal with these breaches 
compared to entities in other sectors.87 As the scope and profitability of 
secondary research increases, the focus of hackers will likely shift to health data 
repositories.88 
Further, as one prominent government regulator notes, “[L]egislating 
security is really tricky . . . . You write down requirements and the bad guys 
immediately supersede them.”89 Many of the breaches or security compromises 
involve government entities90 (although there is no evidence that government 
entities are, on average, less secure than private entities). 
 
ransomware-hackers-bigger-threat-ever-forcing-hospitals-police-pay-hostage-fees-2319822 [https://
perma.cc/ED5G-NZ9J] (describing a “cyberattack that left a California hospital paralyzed until 
administrators agreed to pay a $17,000 ransom”). 
86 Id. 
87 According to a survey, “An overwhelming majority of health care organizations (69 percent) 
and business associates (63 percent) believe they are at greater risk than other industries for a data 
breach.” PONEMON INST., supra note 80, at 3. Only 29 percent in health care said they are prepared 
to handle external cyber threats, far lower than any other industry. Greg Slabodkin, Healthcare and 
Pharma Least Prepared for External Cyber Threats, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (July 18, 2016, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/healthcare-and-pharma-least-prepared-for-external-cyber-
threats [https://perma.cc/Y4UD-YGV7]. Only a quarter in health care feel they can analyze the threats, 
which also lags other industries. Id. 
88 See Are EHR Vendors Hackers’ Next Big Target?, HIT CONSULTANT (Apr. 11, 2016), 
http://hitconsultant.net/2016/04/11/preparing-ehr-vendors-cyber-threats/ [https://perma.cc/D87K-
9Q6G] (predicting that electronic health record providers will be increasingly targeted); see also 
ERNST & YOUNG, NAVIGATING THE BULL BLACK MARKET 7-9 (2016), https://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-navigating-the-bull-black-market/$FILE/ey-navigating-the-bull-black-
market.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3B-XRRW] (noting that pharmaceutical and life sciences firms will 
be targeted for clinical trials data). 
89 David Pittman, AMA Meeting Under Way in Chicago, POLITICO: MORNING EHEALTH (June 
13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/06/politicos-morning-
ehealth-ama-meeting-under-way-in-chicago-hipaa-confusion-in-orlando-shooting-state-seeks-cloud-
based-ehr-214786 [https://perma.cc/788X-B7BP] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 In a two month period alone, government audits have pointed to “numerous weaknesses” in 
the security of Minnesota’s health insurance exchange. AMY J. FRONTZ, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC SUMMARY REPORT: 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CONTROL WEAKNESSES FOUND AT THE MINNESOTA HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE 2 (2016). In addition, audits have found evidence of weak data encryption, 
too many staff members with access to sensitive data, and inconsistent auditing of network activity 
in the FDA. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-513, INFORMATION SECURITY: FDA 
NEEDS TO RECTIFY CONTROL WEAKNESSES THAT PLACE INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
DATA AT RISK 11-19 (2016). Furthermore, such audits have identified many problems and conflicts 
facing federal agencies’ Chief Information Security Officers. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-16-686, FEDERAL CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICERS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 
IMPROVE ROLES AND ADDRESS CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY 26-31 (2016). One recent hack 
involved a contractor of the Milwaukee Veterans Health Affairs Medical Center. See Milwaukee Veterans 
Health Information Hacked, WSAW-TV (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://www.wsaw.com/content/news/
Milwaukee-veterans-health-information-hacked-392226671.html [https://perma.cc/K69W-CWTE] 
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Data breaches have led to instances of identity theft, medical and financial 
fraud, tainted medical records, and insurance discrimination. Scholars have 
also pointed to the risk of employment discrimination that data breaches 
pose.91 In another instance from last summer, a hacker put medical records 
up for sale on the Internet.92 But, as the Brookings Institution observes, 
 
(describing the hacking of a Wisconsin Medical College employee’s email). I focus here on data 
collection and transmission for secondary research by the government. But the few others to 
comment on these data policies are troubled by the initial transmission of data to the government. 
For example, language in another proposed rule states that a “health care provider is permitted to 
disclose protected health information (PHI) (without patient authorization and without a business 
associate agreement)” to a government entity so that it can “perform the required on-site 
surveillance of the certified EHR technology.” Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment 
System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Model (APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee 
Schedule, and Criteria for Physician-Focused Payment Models, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,162, 28,171 (proposed 
May 9, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.Rs. pts. 414, 495). One prominent commentator from the 
Brookings Institution argues that such surveillance “is extremely dangerous and inefficient.” Yaraghi, 
supra note 47. I agree that such surveillance is unnecessary in this case, but in the case of secondary 
research, data collection is necessary. But those burdens should be imposed in a fair manner. 
91 Health data breaches often involve names and social security numbers, such as in a recent 
breach involving Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) data. See Jessica Bartlett, MGH Says 
Patients Impacted by Third-Party Data Breach, BOS. BUS. J. (June 29, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://
www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/health-care/2016/06/mgh-says-patients-impacted-by-third-party-
data.html [https://perma.cc/MZ36-9AG9] (describing a 2016 hack of MGH’s software provider, 
which exposed patient names, birthdays, social security numbers, and medical research). This results 
in identity theft and financial and medical fraud. See Jessica Davis, Ransomware and Tax Fraud Rise 
as Healthcare Hit with More Data Breaches than Any Other Industry, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (April 
13, 2016, 7:58 AM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ransomware-and-tax-fraud-rise-healthcare-
hit-more-data-breaches-any-other-industry [https://perma.cc/GD2N-QL4A] (cataloguing the rise of tax 
fraud and the issues faced by victims); IBM: 70% of Businesses Paid Cybercriminals to Unlock Ransomware, 
HIPAA J. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.hipaajournal.com/phi-theft-by-employees-peacehealth-8210/i 
[https://perma.cc/CD5N-U5TV] (describing instances of medical record theft). This may also 
muddy medical histories. See Darius Tahir & Bob Herman, Data Breaches Can Lead to Major Medical 
Identity Theft Issues, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20150304/NEWS/150309960 [https://perma.cc/TB6K-YCVG] (noting that healthcare data breaches 
can result in a “completely altered medical history” for patients). Health records can be used for 
other medical purposes, such as creating fake opioid prescriptions. See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Why 
Hackers Want Your Health Care Data Most of All, INFOWORLD TECH WATCH (Sep. 14, 2015), 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2983634/security/why-hackers-want-your-health-care-data-
breaches-most-of-all.html [https://perma.cc/W5AL-9WFP] (“Stolen health care data forums 
operate more like drug cartels, where health records are not sold outright, but rather used to buy 
and sell addictive prescriptions.”); see also Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance 
of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 98 (2014) (identifying insurance fraud as 
an example of how patient identify records can be misused). 
92 Dissent Doe, 655,000 Patient Records For Sale on the Dark Net After Hacking Victims Refuse 
Extortion Demands, DAILY DOT (June 27, 2016, 7:29 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/655000-
patient-records-dark-net/ [https://perma.cc/C7H3-3S9Y]. The hacker offered to sell the personal 
information of 655,000 patients whose data were stolen from three databases that refused to pay a 
ransom. Id. Specifically, 48,000 records from a Farmington, Missouri database were offered for 
$100,000; 397,000 records from an Atlanta database were offered for $400,000; and 210,000 records 
from a Central/Midwest database were offered for $200,000. Id. The data include names, addresses, 
Social Security numbers, birthdates, emails, gender, and phone numbers. Id. 
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“Despite the public concerns over health care privacy breaches, we do not 
know exactly why hackers are interested in stealing medical data or how 
exactly they monetize it.”93 For example, hackers may hold on to breached 
records for years before using them to commit medical or financial identity 
theft or blackmail.94 
Although there is “a great deal of confusion about the value of stolen 
medical data in the black market,”95 we know that criminal elements value 
health data. Experts uniformly report that health data is more valuable than 
other data, and that its value is on the rise.96 And information professionals, 
even those that support secondary research, are increasingly worried about 
data breaches. 
Breaches affect private and public institutions alike. But because of the 
new policies described in Part I, the poorer and older bear greater risk. Data 
risk increases as the range of uses, the number of entities with access, and the 
amount and kind of data used increases. Human error is often the most 
important security hurdle as individuals misplace storage devices or transmit 
data over unsecured connections or to incorrect recipients.97 Using identifiers—
especially names and social security numbers—also increases risk.98 
 
93 Niam Yaraghi, To Mitigate Medical Hacks, Identify Incentives for Hackers, BROOKINGS (Aug. 16, 
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/08/16/to-mitigate-medical-hacks-identify-incentives-
for-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/4EHN-MHXQ]. 
94 One IBM Security executive learned that the medical records of his two grade-school-age 
children were compromised in a health care data breach months after it happened. According to the 
Boston Globe, “Those identities are essentially worthless for a criminal seeking quick payoff—
nobody’s going to give a loan to a preteen. But once those kids reach their 18th birthdays . . . , the 
leak could come back to haunt their finances. ‘How long is it going to be before that 18-year-old 
realizes that somebody at another address has established credit in their name?’” Curt Woodward, Health 
Files Make for a Juicy Target for Thieves, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2016/08/07/hackers-turn-health-care-where-records-fetch-bigger-bucks/OSi8imOSGPstvwV6DyYhoJ/
story.html?s_campaign=bostonglobe:socialflow:twitter [https://perma.cc/25QZ-K9YY]. 
95 Yaraghi, supra note 93. 
96 See Goedert, supra note 84 (“Recent events suggest that the pressure [from hackers trying 
to access patient information] may be rising . . . .”). 
97 See Jeff Goldman, December Data Breach Roundup: Theft Prevention, and More, ESECURITY 
PLANET (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/december-data-breach-
roundup-theft-prevention-and-more.html [https://perma.cc/6XRY-DTGM] (advocating for employer 
education as a prevention tool for data breaches). 
98 Privacy advocates are even worried about the possibility of re-identification of de-identified 
data. In a high-profile example of this risk, the former Chief Technology Officer of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Latanya Sweeney, purchased de-identified insurance records from a state insurance 
database when she was a graduate student, and she was able to identify those of then–Massachusetts 
Governor William Weld by combining them with other public data. Daniel Barth-Jones, The Debate 
Over ‘Re-Identification’ of Health Information: What Do We Risk?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/08/10/the-debate-over-re-identification-of-health-informati
on-what-do-we-risk/ [https://perma.cc/6RAK-NQ4Y]. 
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The data of those in CMS programs has experienced a marked increase 
in transmission and accumulation—often in identified formats—for multiple 
uses.99 The data of those in private programs is transmitted and used less, and 
never transmitted externally in identified formats. Those who self-pay may 
never have their data recorded, much less used. 
B. Personhood Harms 
Studies suggest that individuals are concerned with harms that go beyond 
material threats from malicious actors. In many circumstances, individuals 
object to the collection or use of information without consent, even if there 
is no threat—including when the data is used only for research. This concern 
is echoed in recent practices. Within the last two years alone, the federal 
government retained, but then ultimately decided not to implement, a proposal 
to require informed consent for research involving biospecimen data,100 and the 
British National Health Service has come under fire for a project involving 
the transmission of anonymous data to Google for research.101 
The story of Henrietta Lacks presents a good example of the kind of harm 
to which I am alluding. Lacks was an African-American woman who received 
indigent medical care in the 1950s. In the process, her cells with unique 
properties were harvested without her permission. When this was recently 
 
99 Moreover, CMS in particular is not fully compliant with breach notification requirements 
and does not offer remedies to Medicare patients when there are breaches. See Investigation Faults 
Handling of Medicare Patient Data Breaches, AMEDNEWS.COM (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.amednews.
com/article/20121029/business/310299965/6/ [https://perma.cc/ADB8-FRZQ] (noting that the Office of 
the Inspector General “found that Medicare wasn’t doing enough to mitigate damages caused when 
a Medicare patient’s identification is stolen”). 
100 The government first proposed this requirement in its Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking for the Common Rule in 2011, and it retained the requirement in its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking. In explaining why it proposed to retain the consent requirement, the government 
observed, “[T]here is a growing recognition that many people want to have some degree of control 
over the circumstances in which an investigator can derive information about them, above and apart 
from their interest in whether or not that information might be inappropriately disclosed. More 
specifically, a growing body of literature shows that in general people prefer to have the opportunity 
to consent (or refuse to consent) to research involving their own biological materials . . . . [I]t is not 
consistent with the majority of the public’s wishes, which reflect legitimate autonomy interests.” 
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,942, 53,944 (proposed 
Sept. 8, 2015). Notably, the proposed rulemaking cites an infamous incident involving the use of 
Havasupai genes for research without consent. Id. at 53,943 n.43 (citing National Congress of 
American Indians, Havasupai Tribe and the Lawsuit Settlement Aftermath, NAT’L CONGRESS AM. 
INDIANS, http://genetics.ncai.org/case-study/havasupai-Tribe.cfm [https://perma.cc/42Z9-AXEX]). 
However, after receiving significant pressure from industry and other groups, the government 
decided not to impose this requirement. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 
Fed. Reg. 7149, 7165 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
101 See Why Google DeepMind Wants Your Medical Records, BBC (July 19, 2016), http://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-36783521 [https://perma.cc/FM7U-4VYV] (describing the criticism that 
followed the announcement that Google was given access to the health care data of 1.6 million patients). 
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discovered, the settlement that Lacks’s descendants reached did not prohibit 
the use of their genetic data. Rather, they received some control over who 
accesses the data and credit for publications involving the data.102 
The Lacks story is simply an early instance of the growing “biorights” 
movement. Last May, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit 
on behalf of four plaintiffs against Myriad Genetics,103 a company notorious 
for trying to (unsuccessfully) patent genes predicting breast cancer.104 Myriad 
obtains genetic samples from patients and lets them know if they are at risk 
for certain conditions, but does not provide them access to the coded data. 
The suit asks the Department of Health and Human Services “to ensure 
patients have access to all the genetic data a testing company gleans from their 
samples, not simply whether they have a certain gene or condition.”105 In this 
case, the plaintiffs want to make the data available for public research.106 
Studies show that when it comes to data use, consent is key—individuals 
believe that using data without consent is wrong but are happy to provide 
consent if asked.107 Their focus appears to be on the dignitary affront and 
 
102 Malcolm Ritter, NIH, Family of Henrietta Lacks Reach Deal on Access to DNA Code, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/nih-family-of-henrietta-
lacks-reach-deal-on-access-to-dna-code/2013/08/07/68f3da04-ff8b-11e2-96a8-d3b921c0924a_
story.html  [https://perma.cc/3U58-UHKU]. 
103 Beth Daley & Ellen Cranley, ‘Biorights’ Rise: Donors Demand Control of Their Samples, BOS. 
GLOBE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/10/09/the-rise-biorights-donors-
are-demanding-control-and-sometimes-cash-exchange-for-geneticsamples/jCbaQ2E5t6c0Qs1kcITMRM/
story.html [https://perma.cc/GN2A-C6RA]. 
104 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Myriad Genetics Ending Patent Dispute on Breast Cancer Risk Testing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/business/myriad-genetics-ending-
patent-dispute-on-breast-cancer-risk-testing.html [https://perma.cc/M9MT-68VX] (“Myriad 
Genetics has essentially given up trying to stop other companies from offering tests for 
increased risk of breast cancer . . . .”). 
105 Daley & Cranley, supra note 103. Admittedly, individuals are happy to provide their data in 
return for payment. DNAsimple, for example, pays for data. Id. But while whether companies should 
be allowed to pay for this data is an open question, it cannot be denied that payment at least gives 
individuals a sense of control. Patients “feel part of the process when they get compensated.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward 
a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 746 (2004) (“Genetic 
information is seen as a commodity, disaggregated from the self, rather than something in which we 
have a dignitary and personhood interest.”). 
106 Other examples exist. For example, Medtronic refuses requests for patients’ own heart data. 
See Jonah Comstock, Medtronic Launches Connected App for Pacemaker Patients, but Patients Can’t See 
the Data, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/48596/medtronic-
launches-connected-app-for-pacemaker-patients-but-patients-cant-see-the-data [https://perma.cc/
V4M3-4QKA] (describing a Medtronic mobile app that permits patients to forward pacemaker data 
to providers but that does not provide patients with actual access to the data). Indeed, “early players 
in the game have sequestered information in ‘closed loop’ systems.” John T. Wilbanks & Eric J. 
Topol, Stop the Privatization of Health Data, NATURE (July 29, 2016), http://www.nature.com/
news/stop-the-privatization-of-health-data-1.20268 [https://perma.cc/PV77-ZDDP]. 
107 See Daley & Cranley, supra note 103 (“About 68% of people are willing to give permission 
for researchers to use their specimens to be used for any purpose . . . . But support drop[s] to 55% 
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sense of violation that comes from sharing data without consent—rather than 
privacy or security harms.108 
This Article does not seek to identify the precise dignity interest at stake. 
Rather, I rely on a rough analogy to another kind of dignitary or personhood 
harm that has appeared in the property literature. Many years ago, Margaret 
Radin argued that an individual’s property is imbued with their personhood.109 
Property enables the creation and execution of future projects, and populates 
memory with projects past. It helps us conceptualize the individual as a 
continuous entity through time.110 This creates an empirically demonstrated 
psychological link between individuals and their property.111 
Similarly, rights to the information about one’s body, mind, and certain 
objects grant a person autonomy to choose his or her course in life. In 
discussing the learning health system, President Obama explained that it 
helps “empower[] individuals” to monitor and take a more active role in their 
own health.”112 Health data can be used to develop essential life goals related 
 
if patients kn[o]w their sample will be used to ‘develop patents and earn profits for commercial 
companies.’”). And a National Institutes of Health (NIH) survey shows that if asked, a majority of 
Americans (fifty-four percent) said they would “definitely or probably participate” in the NIH’s 
Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program, which requires personal data such as blood samples, 
genetic information, family medical history, soil and water samples from their home, as well as data 
on their lifestyle, diet, and exercise. Survey Shows Broad Support for National Precision Medicine Study 
(Aug. 17, 2016), NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/
survey-shows-broad-support-national-precision-medicine-study [https://perma.cc/4BHU-EHP7]. 
Among younger people, college-educated people, and those who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
or transgender, interest in participation was even higher. Id. 
108 One study found that 77% of individuals would feel “violated and [that their] trust in the 
researchers [would be] betrayed” in such a situation. ALAN F. WESTIN, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS 
PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH 25 (rev. 2008). But only 44% percent feared employment 
discrimination, and just 33% feared embarrassment “before friends, associates or the public.” Id. 
Indeed, only 19% of individuals were willing to have their information used without their consent 
when their anonymity was assured. Id. at 28. Similarly, Westin reviewed previous studies that 
showed a consistent majority who argued that data can only be used with consent. Id. at 45-46; see 
also WESTAT, AHRQ PUB. NO. 09-0081-EF, FINAL REPORT: CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT IN 
DEVELOPING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2 (2009) (“A substantial proportion [of 
focus group participants] felt that health care consumers owned their data and needed a role in ensuring 
that those data were secure and used only in ways that they authorized.”); Evette J. Ludman et al., Glad 
You Asked: Participants’ Opinions of Re-Consent to dbGAP Data Submission, 5 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON 
HUM. RES. ETHICS, Sept. 2010, at 9, 13 (“It was very important or somewhat important to the 
majority . . . of respondents that they were asked for their permission to add their health and genetic 
information to the databank.”). 
109 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982). 
110 See Craig J. Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1378 (2015) (explaining 
Radin’s theory that “property is what permits an individual to project herself into the future or the 
past [and] . . . populate one’s memory with substance”). 
111 See Radin, supra note 109 (noting that property rights provide the control needed to achieve 
proper self-development). 
112 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Precision Medicine Panel 
Discussion (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/remarks-president-
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to individual fitness, health, work, and recreation. For example, data about 
ovulation and other reproductive information (now often generated through 
apps) can assist with planning one’s family.113 Information is therefore used 
to develop a range of life choices in contexts of both work and play. President 
Obama himself supports an autonomy-based ownership understanding of 
information: “[O]nce you understand [that the data is] yours, . . . you have 
agency in the process.”114 
But apart from autonomy, information about an individual’s bodily 
characteristics, whether or not it is attached to a specific identifier, has deeper 
ontological significance.115 It helps us conceptualize the person as a person. 
Information regarding one’s DNA helps establish one’s connection to one’s family, 
perhaps even to one’s ethnic or social group. Key demographic characteristics such 
as race and gender are constructed in part by—and understood through—medical 
frames.116 Other health-relevant information, such as sexual behavior and 
orientation, perform similar functions.117 
Further, the “quantified-self ” movement promotes data streams as the 
best form of self-conceptualization and knowledge.118 This movement promotes 
the use of devices that not only “solve problems related to health,” but also 
produce data about steps walked, heartbeat, calories (consumed and burned), 
 
precision-medicine-panel-discussion [https://perma.cc/VY3B-CS95] [hereinafter President Obama, 
Precision Medicine Panel Remarks]. 
113 See Melissa Willets, The 10 Best Fertility Apps, FITPREGNANCY.COM, http://www.fit
pregnancy.com/pregnancy/getting-pregnant/best-fertility-apps [https://perma.cc/GKQ8-ARAP] 
(exploring how various apps can help individuals with family planning). 
114 Darius Tahir, President Talks eHealth, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.
politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/10/president-talks-ehealth-fda-guidance-announcement-today-
216870#ixzz4Nw5sihqe [https://perma.cc/Z7PP-J2F8]. 
115 Irma van der Ploeg, The Body as Data in the Age of Information, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 176, 181 (Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty & David Lyon eds., 2012). 
116 See generally Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Race and Biology, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RACE (Linda Alcoff et al. eds., forthcoming 2017), 
https://philpapers.org/archive/WINRAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9D6-MZSR]. 
117 In a touching story on a prominent blog, one medical professional writes as follows: “Seven 
years ago, I lost a college-aged patient in a car accident. Placing the final dictation in her chart a 
week later gave me the opportunity to reflect on our relationship and her assorted illnesses, injuries, 
and well visits over almost two decades. What a treasure to behold after years of friendship and 
medical care. Her paper chart was tangible proof of a life well-lived. I recently contacted her mother 
to inquire if she wanted her daughter’s medical chart. She said it was a gift to see her daughter 
through the eyes of her physician, who was there every step of the way. Medical records are more 
than metadata on a computer screen; they are a sacred chronicle of our enduring connection with 
our patients in life, and even in death.” Niran Al-Agba, My Ideal EHR, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 
2016), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2016/08/23/my-ideal-ehr/ [https://perma.cc/Y83T-WMYE]. 
118 As anthropologist Dana Greenfield explains, quantified self is a “utopian project[], where, 
. . . health behaviors can be changed . . . and self-knowledge, -awareness, and -mindfulness can be 
achieved.” Dana Greenfield, Deep Data: Notes on the n of 1, in QUANTIFIED: BIOSENSING 
TECHNOLOGIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE 123, (Dawn Nafus ed., 2016). 
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brainwaves, and breathing—to name a few—as a way of knowing oneself.119 
Indeed, genetic data is popularly framed as the essence of personhood.120 
Thus, one surveillance scholar asks, “[W]here exactly is the transition from 
bodily matter to bodily data? Does it really still make sense to try to make 
the distinction?”121 Modern data collection in the form of DNA codes or 
biomarkers marks a time of transition such that data is not just “representations 
of the body” but rather “a change on the level of ontology.”122 
To be sure, as Radin noted of property, not all information will have the 
same level of import to everyone in all contexts. Property can range from 
items that are deeply constitutive of personhood to “fungible” items like money 
that are held merely for instrumental reasons.123 Similarly, data can range from 
information which embeds and constructs important self-conceptualization to 
facts that hold little meaning. For example, to an HIV-positive person, a low 
white cell blood count can have a major impact; to others, it may not. Depending 
on context, such information can lie on a spectrum. 
But pulled together, even trivial data can create a mosaic picture of the 
individual in which she has deep personhood interests.124 Genetic data can 
help recreate facial structure.125 Various health data brought together could 
predict various personality traits or moods like irritability, depression, 
generosity, and stress. 
Finally, data determines how an individual is seen by others. As Louis 
Althusser’s famous theory of interpellation explains, a person is constituted, 
in part, through the characteristics that society and its members attribute to 
 
119 Kashmir Hill, Adventures in Self-Surveillance, Aka the Quantified Self, Aka Extreme Navel-
Gazing, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/04/07/
adventures-in-self-surveillance-aka-the-quantified-self-aka-extreme-navel-gazing/#1916f7bf7b12 
[https://perma.cc/45E3-C465]; see also Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548493 [https://perma.cc/QU5G-7Q79] (exploring the concept 
of self-tracking and the “belief that gathering and analyzing data about [one’s] everyday activities 
can help . . . improve [one’s] li[fe]”). 
120 For example, 23andMe’s test kit reads “Welcome to You,” and an informational webpage is 
entitled “23 pairs of chromosomes. One unique you.” 23 Pairs of Chromosome, One Unique You, 
23ANDMEBLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://blog.23andme.com/23andme-and-you/23andme-how-to/23-
pairs-of-chromosomes-one-unique-you/ [https://perma.cc/Y9Q2-HA2K]. 
121 van der Ploeg, supra note 115, at 180. 
122 Id. at 178-79. 
123 See Radin, supra note 109, at 960, 966 (describing how some property is fungible to 
everyone, like money, while some property is fungible to certain individuals, like a car to a dealer or 
hair to a wigmaker). 
124 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 
(2012) (suggesting that “five justices are ready to embrace the . . . mosaic approach”). 
125 See Sara Reardon, Mugshots Built from DNA Data: Computer Program Crudely Predicts a Facial 
Structure from Genetic Variations, NATURE (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/mugshots-
built-from-dna-data-1.14899 [https://perma.cc/9DKF-RFGF] (describing a new “computer program 
that can create a . . . 3D model of a face from a DNA sample”). 
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her.126 The collection and analysis of the data categorizes the individual based 
on her genes, medication, addictions, and disease history as low or high risk, 
normal or abnormal, healthy or unhealthy. An individual may well feel 
discomfort at being characterized as abnormal by some faraway anonymous 
researcher even if that label cannot be ultimately attributed to her. 
Even if the data is not used to recategorize the individual per se, individuals 
may object to what is done with their information. Because they retain a bond 
with their information, they may feel responsible when their information is 
used for research into procedures that they find offensive such as abortion or 
blood transfusions.127 In a recent qualitative study, individuals also objected 
to research into “intelligence and race,” which they felt can be used perpetuate 
past discrimination128 and expressed concern that their data may be used by 
“law enforcement in . . . fishing schemes.”129 
Thus, what may be at stake for many individuals is an aspect of their 
personhood. Even if the results of the research cannot be connected back to 
a particular patient, her sense of dignity as an autonomous individual is at 
stake.130 Therefore, individuals feel they have a claim to their information, whether 
it is identified or de-identified. As the Agency for Healthcare Research Quality 
notes, a majority of individuals use the metaphor of ownership to describe their 
relationship with the data, and a majority object to even de-identified use of 
the data without consent.131 
C. Expressive Harms 
Data collection activity can cause what I call “expressive harms.” The way 
in which society distributes its resources and treats individuals’ personhood 
 
126 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production, in LENIN AND 
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 121, 161 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). 
127 See Amy R. Applebaum, Note, When Parental Autonomy Clashes with a Child’s Interest in the 
Advances of Science: The Case for the Future of Court-Ordered Gene Therapy, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1543, 
1547-48 (2002) (“Many cases involving court-ordered medical treatments of minors have involved 
the objections of Jehovah’s Witnesses to blood transfusions based on their religion’s mandate 
forbidding such procedures . . . .”). 
128 Catherine M. Hammack, The Petrie–Flom Ctr. for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and 
Bioethics, 2016 Annual Conference: Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics: Thought Leader 
Perspectives on Risks and Protections in Precision Medicine Research (June 16, 2016), https://www.
slideshare.net/petrieflom/catherine-m-hammack-thought-leader-perspectives-on-risks-and-protections-
in-precision-medicine-research [https://perma.cc/RQ86-QLWX]. 
129 Id. 
130 Even if information is never improperly released and never results in any concrete harms, 
information collection is inherently a status-creating activity. Konnoth, supra note 7, at 64. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized several times, information collection has an expressive aspect; it can 
humiliate or “send a message.” Id. at 17, 20, 23. 
131 See WESTAT, supra note 108, at 6 (explaining that surveys suggest health care consumers 
want to “decide what goes into and who can access their medical records”). 
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symbolically demonstrates respect or disrespect towards them. Welfare 
recipients are constantly surveilled: social workers intrude into their homes 
to supervise their family and child-rearing behavior, their food consumption 
is monitored, and they are subject to random drug tests.132 Racial minorities 
are subject to searches in schools and on the streets, and certain reproductive 
choices that poor women make are subject to surveillance.133 
Placing these individuals under greater degrees of scrutiny than other 
members of society marks them as less deserving of privacy, and as having less 
of a right to determine when and how information about them should be 
released. Those who can control information access, by contrast, are imbued 
with social status. Subjecting only certain groups of individuals in society to 
information burdens and exempting others reinforces existing hierarchies in 
society.134 
In particular, through the programs I describe, individuals on Medicare 
and Medicaid are situated within a framework where they are regularly 
subjected to informational risk and indignity.135 By marking low-income 
individuals in this way, health information surveillance further “otherizes” 
them from mainstream society and citizenship. 
But the kind of surveillance that occurs here imposes a new kind of 
exploitative indignity. Health information is a resource in which individuals have 
intimate personhood interests, whether the data is identified or de-identified. 
Moreover, maintaining the material wellbeing necessary for autonomy—
employment, health insurance, and engagement with the medical system—also 
requires informational integrity. Disproportionately sacrificing a group’s 
privacy, information security, and dignity for the benefit of the population as 
 
132 See Bryce Covert, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients Is a Popular New Policy that Costs States 
Million. Here Are the Results, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/drug-
testing-welfare-recipients-is-a-popular-new-policy-that-cost-states-millions-here-are-the-cf82925
7ade0#.jp2rkxrfn [https://perma.cc/262V-A79Z] (“At least 13 state legislatures have enacted laws to 
drug test TANF applicants or beneficiaries.”). 
133 See Konnoth, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that “parents may be informed about the 
reproductive decisions of their minor children within their custody”). 
134 See id. at 37 (“[I]ntrusions and surveillance are inherently confrontational and hierarchizing.”). 
135 Intriguingly, a 1990 letter to the New York Times suggests that privacy may be a luxury only 
the wealthy can afford. See Hollis Robbins, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Let Privacy Be a Luxury for the 
Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/04/opinion/l-don-t-let-
privacy-be-a-luxury-for-the-wealthy-927590.html [https://perma.cc/L3KJ-GY8Q] (describing the 
prohibitive cost of maintaining a caller ID block); see also Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional 
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of A “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1038 (2014) 
(describing searches in economically distressed and historically disadvantaged communities); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right 
of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (1991) (noting that government intrusion into the lives of 
pregnant women is particularly harsh for poor women of color); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 392, 406 (2003) (arguing that poor people 
are afforded fewer privacy and autonomy protections than the wealthy). 
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a whole, rather than using it only in service of group wellbeing, constitutes a 
kind of exploitation of one part of the population for the rest. This harms 
dignity interests—not just because of how data is collected, but because of how 
it is used. 
This renders the health information collection system different from 
other kinds of information programs. Welfare, penal, and reproductive 
surveillance is based on paternalism or stereotyping and grounded in 
perceptions of difference—of danger, dishonesty, or immaturity.136 But the 
health information collection system is, ironically, based on a perception of 
biological sameness. Rendering CMS data the basis for population-based 
medical research makes sense only if one believes that beneficiaries’ data is 
on some level similar to that of the rest of the population. This sameness 
becomes the ground for a kind of exploitation that exempts those who can 
afford private insurance from the obligations of information collection, while 
still allowing them access to the benefits. The poor and elderly become 
proxies in a conscription scheme for the greater good. 
This harm is best conceptualized by Julie Cohen’s work on the 
commodification of individuals as data.137 Cohen argues that commercial big 
data ventures seek to “extract . . . marketplace value” from consumers, who 
are treated as “a repository of raw materials that are there for the taking and 
that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive activity.”138 The 
function of these technologies is anti-individualistic: it is “to subsume 
individual variation and idiosyncrasy within a probabilistic gradient. Their 
purpose is to make human behaviors and preferences calculable [and] 
predictable . . . in aggregate . . . . [P]artial (or even complete) misalignments 
at the individual level are irrelevant.”139 
Cohen focuses on the consumer marketplace, but many of her insights can 
be extended to medical research as well. Despite how laudable the result may 
be, harvesting medical data shifts its role. Where medical research was once 
individuated—the means for diagnosis, treatment, and cure of the individual—it 
becomes alienated and harnessed for the purposes of others. Cohen relies on the 
famous case Moore v. Regents of the University of California, where a patient 
sued to assert a right to the products made from his cells.140 Such processes 
 
136 Konnoth, supra note 7, at 51. 
137 My solution, of course, only addresses inequality related problems. The broader issues that 
Cohen identifies may suggest limiting the system altogether. As I note in the Introduction, I am not 
averse to this outcome—as long as whatever outcome is achieved is done so in a way that is equitable. 
138 Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain 2 (Sept. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666570. 
139 Id. at 19. 
140 See id. at 24 (discussing Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 
(Cal. 1990), which held that patients do not have a right to share in the profits earned from the 
research of their cells). Cohen also identifies the harnessing of subordinated populations’ (such as 
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“naturalize[] practices of appropriation” as applied to specific groups such as 
those on welfare.141 
This kind of exploitation undermines autonomy by creating a relationship 
of domination over poorer and older individuals. Iris Marion Young identifies 
exploitation as the first of oppression’s faces: exploitation “occurs through a 
steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to 
benefit another.”142 Here, it is not the labor of individuals that is being 
sacrificed, but rather, their privacy, information, medical security, and even 
their dignity. Rather than deploying resources for their own flourishing and 
according to their own perceptions of what is good, the poor and elderly are 
being asked to sacrifice for others. 
D. Medical Harms 
Finally, for those who remain unmoved by the dignitary harms visited 
upon individuals because of what they may characterize as uneducated 
attitudes toward data, these issues raise practical consequences as well. 
Surveys show that many individuals avoid receiving medical care rather than 
being subject to health collection mandates. For example, the California 
Health Care Foundation found that 13-17% of consumers attempt to hide 
information to protect their privacy.143 
The avoidance varies by medical condition, and such behavior is usually 
most prevalent in the early stages of the onset of a condition. Thus, HHS 
estimated that based on privacy concerns, 586,000 Americans did not seek 
earlier cancer treatment and that roughly 2,000,000 Americans did not seek 
treatment for mental illness.144 Likewise, HHS noted that “there [was] great 
 
welfare recipients) data more generally than discussed here. See Cohen, supra note 138, at 11 (“The 
push to exploit the biopolitical public domain is a contest over a postcolonial terrain, in which global 
networked elites seek to harness the power of populations worldwide.”). 
141 Id. at 25. 
142 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 49 (2011 ed. 2011). 
Bioethics scholarship is of course replete with discussion and definition of exploitation. See, e.g., 
Ruth Macklin, Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection, 17 BIOETHICS 472, 475 (2003) (discussing the 
exploitation of vulnerable populations in medical research). But Young better explains the structural 
kind of exploitation with which I am concerned. An individual’s sense of self, personhood, identity, 
and capacity to function is, to various degrees, formed, supported, and maintained using social 
resources, institutions, community norms, symbols, hermeneutics, habits, and tradition. See Simon 
Caney, Liberalism and Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate, 40 POL. STUD. 273, 276-79 (1992) 
(explaining the “embeddedness thesis,” which states that “it is a sociological fact that a person’s 
character is shaped . . . by cultural context”). 
143 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005 4 
(2005), http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20C/PDF%20
consumerprivacy2005execsum.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FYS-ARVC]. 
144 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 
82,777-79 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
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uncertainty” as to the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases “due to 
under-reporting.” 145 
These programs, which render the data of the poor and elderly more easily 
available for secondary research, are in their early stages. To my knowledge, 
their existence has passed under the radar. But as further research makes the 
disparate use of this data apparent, along with the concomitant dignity, privacy, 
and security harms, it might well increase distrust in the public medical system. 
A single data breach of CMS data would be even more devastating. 
The effects could last generations among poor and elderly populations. 
We see analogs elsewhere—the dignitary and material harms faced by racial 
minorities in the United States, for example, has led to dramatic mistrust of 
law enforcement. In the medical context, the closest analog might be the 
Tuskegee Study, which left syphilis untreated in 600 African-American 
men.146 For forty years, the men were kept from many forms of treatment for 
the sake of research without knowing the study existed.147 Many researchers 
believe that that study continues to bear significant responsibility for 
mistrustful attitudes toward medical care and research participation, and for 
the resultant negative medical outcomes, among African Americans.148 
Although the physical harms it imposes are lesser, the differential treatment 
of their data can similarly harm the relationship of the poor and elderly with 
the medical system by decreasing trust. 
*       *      * 
The poor and elderly are uniquely vulnerable to the harms I have listed. 
Financial or medical identity theft can wipe out one’s life savings or lead to 
delays in receiving medical services. While financial identity theft might take 
greater amounts of money from wealthier individuals in absolute terms, low-
income, less-educated, and elderly individuals are less likely to be able to 
recover from medical or financial identity theft, go without medical care, or 
pay for medical care out of pocket.149 
 
145 Id. at 82,778. 
146 Susan M. Reverby, Introduction: More than a Metaphor: An Overview of the Scholarship of the 
Study, in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 1, 1 (Susan M. 
Reverby ed., 2000). 
147 Id. 
148 See generally id. 
149 See Jessica Coombs, Note, Scamming the Elderly: An Increased Susceptibility to Financial 
Exploitation Within and Outside of the Family, ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 243, 252-53 (2014) (“When the 
younger generation [suffer financial losses,] they have more of an opportunity to recover, whereas 
the elderly might never get back on their feet after what has the potential to be such a tremendous loss.”). 
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Similarly, status and dignity harms may be uniquely difficult for low-
income and elderly individuals.150 Both groups may have status concerns 
because they may see themselves as dependent. Both groups are subject to 
relatively greater surveillance and supervision.151 Harnessing their data for 
the rest of society, rather than for their own good, can therefore be 
particularly harmful to their dignity. 
III. ARGUING FOR EQUITY 
So far, I have identified how laws and regulation have facilitated 
informational inequities. Principles of bioethics help explain the problems 
with these inequities.152 This, in turn, has policy ramifications, as research 
regulations largely look to principles of bioethics for guidance. Thus, agencies 
from HHS to the Department of Defense, the Department of Education, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the FDA rely on bioethical principles 
to set research policy in their respective areas.153 
 
150 While some studies consider privacy preferences based on age, these studies cannot control 
for the fact that younger individuals have yet to experience various adult situations in which privacy 
is more important. As ACLU lawyer Jay Stanley notes, a teen or young adult may, when asked about 
the importance of privacy, only think about the question in a world where the intruders are parents, 
teachers, or other trusted observers. They do not consider employment or insurance discrimination, 
law enforcement, or other entities. Jay Stanley, Do Young People Care About Privacy?, ACLU (Apr. 
29, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/do-young-people-care-about-privacy?redirect=blog/
technology-and-liberty/do-young-people-care-about-privacy [https://perma.cc/YQ7N-G6HW]. In 
any case, these studies show that older individuals value privacy more than younger individuals. One 
might therefore conclude that at least for now, intrusions on the elderly are experienced as more 
burdensome. To my knowledge, no robust studies have examined privacy preferences based on income. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 31–54; see also ELDER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 18-
26 (Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison McChrystal Barnes eds., 5th ed. 2011)  (explaining how the elderly 
are reliant on the support of others); id. at 355-407 (discussing guardianship); id. at 409-33 
(discussing power of attorney); id. at 447-502 (discussing health care surrogate decisionmaking); id. 
at 503-69 (discussing the vulnerability and supervision of elderly with respect to domestic and 
institutional caregivers). Of course, not all elderly individuals suffer from a loss of privacy, but more 
elderly individuals are vulnerable in this way than the general population. 
152 No positive legal provision is doctrinally violated by this problem of inequity. Indeed, the 
federal statutes discussed in Part I pave the way for these inequities. 
153 See, e.g., Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6CJ8-
X9GS] (“The current U.S. system of protection for human research subjects is heavily influenced 
by . . . basic ethical principles . . . .”); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 
80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,940, 53,942 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing the influence of bioethicists 
in current initiatives and highlighting the “ethical importance of obtaining consent for genomics 
research”); Response to Comments Received for “The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding 
Information and Communication Technology Research” (“The Menlo Report”) for the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology, Cyber Security Division (CSD), Protected 
Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats (PREDICT) Project, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 73,669, 73,670 (Dec. 11, 2012) (stating that the Menlo Report, which sets forth ethical guidelines 
for information security research, is “founded on the Belmont Model, which was originally 
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Much of this policy is guided by the Belmont Report for the Protection 
of Human Subjects.154 The 1979 Report, prepared by the National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
has laid out the essential principles of biomedical research for the last four 
decades. It was prompted in part by the research atrocities perpetrated during 
World War II and the Tuskegee Study.155 
The Report identifies three principles as fundamental: “respect for 
persons,” “beneficence,” and “justice.”156 The principle of respect demands 
consideration of an individual’s “autonomous” choice.157 Beneficence requires 
“secur[ing] the[] well-being” of individuals.158 Justice considers “fairness in 
distribution.”159 Each of these principles is underdefined in the abstract and 
takes on a shape in particular contexts. The equity problem with secondary 
research primarily implicates questions of justice. 
A generation ago, the Report anticipated some of the issues with which I 
engage. The Commission observed that in previous “centuries[,] the burdens 
of serving as research subjects fell largely upon poor ward patients, while the 
benefits of improved medical care flowed primarily to private patients.”160 It 
therefore cautioned that “the selection of research subjects needs to be 
scrutinized in order to determine whether some classes (e.g., welfare patients . . .) 
are being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, [or] 
their compromised position.”161 
For various reasons, however, burden–equity considerations have not 
traveled into modern health information ethics. First, as a Belmont Report 
coauthor Albert Jonsen notes, “Justice was the neglected sibling among the 
principles of bioethics, always acknowledged but seldom given significant 
tasks or much praise.”162 In the health information context in particular, the 
ethical focus is almost exclusively on autonomy concerns, namely, on the 
 
developed for the biomedical research context”); Protections for Subjects in Human Research, 71 
Fed. Reg. 6138, 6161 (Feb. 6, 2006) (describing a “principal incentive to conduct research ethically”); 
Protection of Human Subjects, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,156, 28,156 (proposed May 22, 1997) (noting that the 
proposed rule is “needed to secure additional protections for children who are involved as subjects 
of research”). 
154 Belmont Report, supra note 12. 
155 King, supra note 13, at 137. 
156 See Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23,192 (capitalization omitted). 
157 Id. at 23,193. 
158 Id. at 23,194. 
159 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 413 (1998). 
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amount and kind of consent required to collect and use data, and the 
importance of privacy protections.163 
Second, justice as it is conceptualized today looks very different than its 
Belmont avatar. The problem I grapple with raises the question of how to 
distribute burdens. However, as Patricia King—another Report coauthor—
notes more recently, “the last thirty years” of bioethics have produced a 
“dramatic change” where questions of justice are concerned.164 Ethicists now 
emphasize “access” to the “benefits” of research rather than “protection,” from 
its “risks and burdens.”165 If anything, research ethics is concerned with the 
lack of inclusion of minorities and women in randomized control trials, rather 
than the overinclusion of such groups.166 
Third, apart from noting in passing that “social practices such as 
punishment, taxation and political representation” engage with questions of 
 
163 Different groups endorse the weighing of autonomy against health interests. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 325 (2000) 
(“Legislation . . . cannot provide absolute privacy protection while still affording reasonable access 
to data to achieve important public health purposes.”). The outcome of this balancing depends on 
context. See I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using Complex 
Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1144 (2014) (“Predictive analytics falls 
between two well-accepted models regarding consent. On the one hand, [it] resembles clinical 
research, in which explicit consent is usually required. On the other hand, it also resembles quality 
assurance or quality improvement activities, in which consent is not generally required.”); Don E. 
Detmer, Your Privacy or Your Health—Will Medical Privacy Legislation Stop Quality Health Care?, 12 
INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 1, 2 (2000) (“The issue resembles a teeter-totter with health 
on one end and privacy on the other. Where one places the fulcrum of law beneath the board is 
crucial.”). Of course, a key problem is that autonomy-seeking consent approaches do not work very 
well because patients do not read or understand these policies. See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains 
for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 703 (2013) (noting that 
most Americans do not understand the payment systems that American hospitals use). 
164 King, supra note 13, at 136; see also Madison Powers, Theories of Justice in the Context of 
Research (“A striking consequence of the egalitarian’s focus on goods such as income, wealth, and 
health care, which persons need to flourish, is that the distribution of burdens and risks can remain 
largely ignored in the analysis.”), in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 147, 150 
(Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998); Charles Weijer, Evolving Ethical Issues in Selection of Subjects for 
Clinical Research, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 334, 343 (1996) (noting that “a number 
of issues, in succession [have been] viewed by ethicists to be the prime concern in the selection of 
subjects for clinical research”). 
165 King, supra note 13, at 136 (emphasis added). 
166 See id.; see also Carol Levine, Changing Views of Justice After Belmont: AIDS and the Inclusion 
of “Vulnerable” Subjects (“[R]esearchers . . . should not offer potentially beneficial research only to 
some persons who are in their favor . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), in THE ETHICS OF 
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21ST CENTURY 105, 107 (Harold Y. 
Vanderpool ed., 1996). Many argue that the shift resulted due to the legacy of HIV, where certain 
groups were excluded from participation in HIV clinical trials in which the best medication was 
available. See, e.g., Robert J. Levine, The Impact of HIV Infection on Society’s Perception of Clinical Trials, 
4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 93, 95 (1994) (“AIDS activists . . . correctly pointed out that 
enrollment in [the azidothymidine drug] clinical trial was the only way for HIV-infected persons to 
get even a 50 percent chance of receiving the only therapy that offered any hope of delaying death 
or the onset of opportunistic infections.”). 
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burden–equity, the Report does not provide a burden–equity analysis.167 
Since the literature has not had occasion to engage with the question since 
then, a robust explanation is required. 
A. Health Information Norms 
In a 2016 discussion about precision medicine and the learning health 
system, President Obama explained that we are building a shared communal 
resource: “all of us . . . could have electronic medical records that . . . we 
pool together . . . that researchers, practitioners, [and] scientists can 
share.”168 This would require engagement from all segments of the 
population: “from the private sector, from the public sector, from the non-
for-profit sector, from the medical community, [and] from researchers.”169 
This shared purpose draws on intuitions of reciprocity. The President 
was quick to emphasize that, as an initial matter, the data belonged to the 
patient: “I would like to think that if somebody does a test on me or my 
genes, that that’s mine.”170 But by providing the data that they owned, 
individuals would be repaid in medical benefits, and their contributions 
would allow us to “individualiz[e] treatments for a particular patient.”171 The 
system will “give all of us access to the personalized information we need to 
keep ourselves and our families healthier.”172 Thus, even as all individuals 
contribute to the system, all individuals draw from it in various ways 
The fairness and reciprocity that undergirds the President’s description 
has broad intuitive appeal. Both popular and moral accounts deploy this kind 
of reasoning in other contexts to justify pooling of resources. For example, 
scholars and politicians have used solidarity- and reciprocity-based approaches to 
justify tax policy.173 
 
167 Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23,194. 
168 President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112. 
169 Id. A former FDA Commissioner, Robert Califf, even suggested that it is a “patriotic” duty 
to provide information. Darius Tahir, Administration with Big PMI Moves, POLITICO (July 7, 2016, 
10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/07/administration-with-big-
pmi-moves-congressional-roundup-cms-with-meaningful-use-tweaks-215208 [https://perma.cc/MF
G5-G6ER] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112. 
171 Id. 
172 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 
2015), transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-
president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/QDB2-WMPM]. 
173 See Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and 
Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 406 (2005) (explaining the new benefit principle of 
taxation, which “purports to be a norm of tax fairness that . . . postulat[es] that the measure of a 
person’s benefit from government is none other than his or her financial . . . well-being”); American 
Community Survey (ACS): Is the American Community Survey Mandatory?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/survey-is-mandatory.html [https://perma.cc/X
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Everyday moral reasoning assesses a particular activity based on the 
norms of the context or institution in which it is situated—the particular law 
school, family, or community. We decide if that is “the way we do things here.” 
Thus, here, we consider only the processes generally attributed to the health 
information system. We do not consider processes, resources, or people’s 
social situations outside the system. Adopting this internal point of view 
allows us to provide a prima facie assessment of the justice of the policies within 
the health information system without grappling with the complications of a 
broader perspective that accounts for other social institutions. 
We know that contemporary health information policies facilitate a world 
in which the poor and elderly, as a group, will provide most of the health 
information. We also know they may enjoy unique benefits from the health 
information system. Health information research, as explained above, can 
roughly be divided into health care delivery research, carried out using claims 
data, and clinical research, carried out using EHR data.174 
Medicare and Medicaid are unique public health insurance programs with 
health care delivery that can be sui generis due to their size and structure. 
The claims data from these programs might reflect this uniqueness, and 
research using that data could conceivably provide primary benefits for the 
programs and their beneficiaries. 
But clinical research that CMS policies will eventually produce will accrue 
to everyone’s benefit.175 While there may be some conditions that are more 
common among the poor and elderly, there is no major condition that is unique 
to those groups of individuals. Adverse health events impact everyone. Yet, many 
 
DJ8-W6MZ] [hereinafter ACS Survey] (emphasizing social unity to describe why the American 
Community Survey is mandatory); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 
1153 (2006). In fact, through regressive consumption taxes and graduated income taxes, President 
Lincoln sought to send the message that “all Northern citizens were supporting the war equally,” 
and Republican lawmakers “employ[ed] the rhetoric of patriotism and shared sacrifice to frame the 
paying of new robust taxes as a form of loyalty to the Union.” Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Price of Conflict: 
War, Taxes, and the Politics of Fiscal Citizenship, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1053, 1060-61 (2010). Similarly, as 
historian Carol Jones argues, although dramatic expansion of the tax base during World War II hurt 
the less well-off, it sent a solidarity-driven message: all citizens shared the cost of war. See Carolyn 
C. Jones, Mass-Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940–1952 (explaining that tax-
focused “propaganda messages throughout the war used a theme of comparative sacrifice”), in 
FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995, at 107, 114 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); 
see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (2006) (noting that 
many governments used World War II “to greatly expand their income tax collections”). 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
175 The harms to which I point are not immediate, of course. The system has not yet completed 
the process of making data available. Benefits are further down the line. See Mike Orcutt, The White 
House Is Pushing Precision Medicine, but It Won’t Happen for Years, MIT TECH. REV. (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601883/the-white-house-is-pushing-precision-medicine-but-
it-wont-happen-for-years/ [https://perma.cc/TMA4-PM57] (“[W]e are many years from realizing 
[the] ‘new era of medicine’ the [P]resident described in his 2015 State of the Union address . . . .”). 
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individuals who are richer or younger will gain access to benefits without their 
data ever being used in clinical research. And many have already raised concerns 
that fewer benefits will accrue to the worse off as time goes on.176 
And even when it comes to claims data, there is evidence to show that 
commercial entities are seeking to use the data to improve the lot of the richer 
from whom they can expect better remuneration. Take, for example, the 
research program I describe above arising from the ACA and subsequent 2015 
legislation.177 The ACA program originally forbade using data for purposes 
other than CMS quality improvement (which excluded, for example, 
generalizable secondary research that could benefit non-CMS beneficiaries as 
well).178 Notwithstanding the statutory ban, research entities sought greater 
freedom after the proposed rules were issued so that they could market a 
greater range of private analyses that did not pertain to CMS quality 
improvement.179 CMS, of course, pointed out that the statute prohibited such 
broader uses.180 
But the 2015 legislation changed the ACA standard to allow qualified 
entities to perform any analysis, including secondary research for certain data 
suppliers—such as providers, employers, and insurers.181 CMS noted that it 
expected that the number of entities applying to use the data to increase due 
to the more permissive 2015 regime.182 The policies therefore facilitate an 
outcome that does not conform to basic intuitions of reciprocity and fair play, 
by using the data of only CMS beneficiaries for everyone’s potential benefit. 
To be sure, the system may not capture everyone’s data. One-and-a-half 
percent of individuals will never interact with the medical system183 and 
therefore may never gain from these data analyses. But the vast majority of 
society should give back through health information contributions to the 
system from which they draw. The only way to maintain the shared stake that 
demands reciprocity is by requiring equitable contributions from all individuals. 
 
176 See, e.g., Barbara Feder Ostrov, The Challenge of Taking Health Apps Beyond The Well-Heeled, 
NPR (June 23, 2016, 8:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/06/23/483098999/
the-challenge-of-taking-health-apps-beyond-the-well-heeled [https://perma.cc/W25W-3Y6F] (discussing 
the importance of “tailor[ing] digital health technologies to lower-income people not only to be fair, but 
because they’re more likely to have chronic illnesses . . . that are expensive to treat”). 
177 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
178 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 76,542, 76,542 (Dec. 7, 2011). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Medicare Program: Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 5397, 5415 (Feb. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 401) (increasing access for nonpublic 
analyses of data); see also id. at 5400 (discussing the details of how to identify providers and suppliers 
of these now expanded analyses). 
182 Id. at 5398. 
183 See CDC STATISTICS, supra note 75. 
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B. General Social Norms 
Although everyday moral reasoning starts out with accounts internal to 
specific contexts, those contexts are embedded within larger social structures. 
Reflection often involves abstracting up and testing the robustness of our 
intuitions against sets of moral norms that apply more generally. When 
assessing a certain behavior, it is not enough to decide whether “it is the way 
we do things here”; we also assess how the behavior comports with broader 
social values about justice and fairness. 
An example of this is the taxation system. In the abstract, one could argue 
that the central goal of taxation is merely to provide for the upkeep of 
government. Norms of equity and reciprocity may seem to counsel a flat tax 
system with everyone contributing equally. But our existing system considers 
a range of values that borrow from various other social norms such as justice, 
equity, family, and mutual obligation.184 We consider the position of 
individuals in society more generally—their income, health, age, and family 
size—and we modulate contributions as well as payouts.185 Those with higher 
incomes receive less and pay more. 
 
184 See C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All? (discussing seven adjustments made 
to ensure equity in tax contributions including “income in-kind, potential income or consumption, 
need, transfers paid and received prices, household size, and measurement period”), in TAX 
JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253, 273-78 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 
2002). Even if one just used income, what income metric should be used? See generally Alan J. 
Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. ASS’N 1116 (2002), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7035.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS2K-U4GK] (discussing available models 
by which to measure income); Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271 (2007) (defending the theory of luck egalitarianism, which 
prioritizes personal responsibility in the context of redistributive justice). For example, even with 
as fundamental a measure as income, some argue that potential income is a better measure than actual 
income. See Steuerle, supra, at 274. The idea is that individuals should be compared based on the 
potential income they may earn for fairness reasons. An individual who is able to earn more income 
and contribute more to society—but chooses not to—should pay more than an individual whose 
maximum potential is lesser, even if the latter actually earns more than the former. Second, those 
who take such a position may argue that taxing actual income may disincentivize individuals from 
maximizing income. But others respond that we cannot ethically force individuals to earn their 
optimum income. Taxing the potential income of individuals who earn suboptimally is unethical 
under the redistributive and benefit principles, and also impractical—a fool’s errand that seeks to 
collect money that isn’t there. Finally, measuring actual income is feasible; measuring potential 
income is not. Id. at 275. Accordingly, we rely on actual rather than potential income to assess taxes. 
Similar to the income context, some may argue that potential—rather than actual health—is 
the better criterion to use when calculating welfare. We should not treat an individual who does not 
take care of her health with the same care as someone who suffers through no choice of her own. 
But, as in the income context, we cannot always force individuals to engage in behaviors that are 
optimal for their health. And it is then arguably unethical (though perhaps not impractical) to 
increase burdens on those with poor health. Finally, measuring actual health is feasible. Measuring 
potential health under current technology is not. 
185 Steuerle, supra note 184, at 274. 
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We do not always consider extra-contextual values. Some settings, such as 
the military, are insulated from society as a whole such that broader norms 
and standards of society do not always apply. But the health information 
system is not such a setting; it is embedded within a larger social context from 
which it draws and to which it contributes. The system relies on technology 
developed in other contexts, as well as the taxes and premiums that support 
the medical apparatus as a whole. Individuals who participate in those areas 
indirectly support the health information system. In turn, as President Obama 
noted, the system contributes back to society: it “promises to reduce costs, 
provide much better care, [and] make our entire health care system much 
more effective.”186 This allows society to focus its resources in other areas 
from which we benefit. 
Even those who never interact with the system may therefore benefit from 
it indirectly.187 A law professor who never needs the doctor still depends on 
the productivity of her colleagues and law review editors.188 The time she can 
devote to her work depends in part on whether society can help address any 
poor health experienced by those in her charge.189 
Further, broader social contexts give us referents to value the contributions 
that the system makes. How to value a cure, for example, depends largely upon 
the real world effects of a disease on human functioning—which may differ from 
human to human—and its prevalence. Some societies might penalize certain 
kinds of bad health or devote resources to projects other than improving the 
health of the unwell; others attempt to diminish hardship, invest in health 
care, value jobs that require one to be able-bodied, and so on.190 
 
186 President Obama, Precision Medicine Panel Remarks, supra note 112. 
187 This responds to an objection by Iain Brassington against obligations for research 
contributions that has remained unaddressed in the bioethics literature. See Iain Brassington, John 
Harris’ Argument for a Duty to Research, 21 BIOETHICS 160, 162 (2007) (“[T]here is no problem with 
free riding when the benefits of research that I enjoy are paid for by some sort of insurance.”). 
188 See ALLEN JENKINS & RON KONECNY, NEBRASKA MEDICAID EXPANSION 33-35 (2015), 
http://www.nebraskahospitals.org/file_download/inline/9eb5a4d7-8725-4385-959f-0f404c895128 
[https://perma.cc/UZU5-TWMV] (“Programs that improve the health and vitality of workers 
improve the quality of labor.”). 
189 As Bill Sage notes, “One person’s malady can harm families, workplaces, clubs, churches, 
and sometimes entire communities.” William M. Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still American, 
in THE HASTINGS CTS., CONNECTING AMERICAN VALUES WITH HEALTH REFORM 10, 10 
(Mary Crowley ed., 2009). 
190 See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 57 (2008) 
(arguing that Rawls’s conception of primary social goods can be broadened to include “health-care 
institutions among the basic institutions involved in providing for fair equality of opportunity”); see 
also Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, 
and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 184-85 (2002) (arguing that “we should establish a fund that 
we all contribute to equally [to] . . . cover[] the costs of [accommodating] any characteristic for 
which the law has created a reasonable accommodation mandate”). 
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As the health information system is embedded within a set of larger social 
structures, we should consider theories of political obligation that apply to 
society more generally. These theories tell us how an individual’s place in 
society affects and constructs the kinds of claims she can make on society as 
a whole, and the duties she owes. Those claims and obligations, in turn, 
permeate all social contexts and affect assessments of fairness internal to 
them, including those in the health information system. 
Although this is not the place to advance a fully outlined theory of 
political obligation, many such existing, mainstream theories support the 
conclusion that data collection and its use for secondary research should be 
carried out equitably.191 Some would argue that those who are richer or 
younger gain a lot from society and therefore should pay society back and 
that a poor and elderly individual owes less. Assisting more vulnerable groups 
also accords with approaches that require that all individuals have certain 
basic capabilities and autonomy. Theories of general utilitarianism may also 
require redistribution toward the more vulnerable to improve social welfare 
as a whole because the marginal improvements to the more vulnerable exceed 
the losses to the better off. I do not pick among these theories, beyond noting 
that their conclusion—that we should redistribute resources to assist the 
worse off in many cases—undergirds many social and economic policies. 
Indeed, some would claim that to achieve equity, we should redistribute 
risk from the more vulnerable to the less vulnerable. Such a claim relies on 
two premises. Many believe that society currently does not do enough to help 
 
191 Such theories are usually far more complex than the simple, intuitive, reciprocity claims 
that I deploy—reciprocity by itself might prove indeterminate without some theory concerning 
baseline rights and duties. Many political theorists, of course, share this intuition. Some more 
famous approaches include Rawls’s difference principle, see J.E.J. Altham, Rawls’s Difference Principle, 
48 PHILOSOPHY 75, 75 (1973) (“The difference principle states that the long-run expectations of the 
least advantaged social group should be maximized.”), and Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approaches. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000) (“[T]he best approach to this idea of a basic social 
minimum is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people are 
actually able to do and to be . . . .”); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009) (outlining 
the capability approach, which “in contrast with the utility-based or resource-based lines of thinking, 
[notes that] individual advantage is judged . . . by a person’s capability to do things he or she has 
reason to value”). Moreover, communitarian theories might impose duties to assist other members 
of the community. See, e.g., Per Bauhn, The Extension and Limits of the Duty to Rescue, 3 PUB. REASON, 
June 2011, at 39, 46 (“[W]e have a duty of necessity to rescue someone whose basic well-being is 
endangered . . . .”). A benefit theory might suggest that the rich gain more from living in society so 
they owe more back to it. See YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 132 (1993) (discussing the theory of 
political obligations which views them as “way[s] of paying the debts one owes the state, following the 
enjoyment of benefits and services one has received from it”). See generally JOHN HORTON, POLITICAL 
OBLIGATION (2010). 
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vulnerable individuals—at least low-income individuals.192 This claim is both 
descriptive and normative. As a normative matter, the claim first assumes that 
there is a particular level of assistance and basic goods that is owed to all 
individuals. As a descriptive matter, the claim next asserts that this society 
does not meet that obligation. Society therefore has an obligation to alleviate 
the burdens on the poor and elderly through available means, including through 
the health information system. 
Each of these intuitions is subject to challenge. First, my normative claim 
that we must help those who are vulnerable may be questioned. Countervailing 
theories assert that those who are worse off in society are owed nothing.193 
Such theorists may indeed argue that since they are owed nothing in the first 
place, those who receive Medicare and Medicaid are getting a windfall, and—
if anything—should be repaying society. Those with this set of moral priors 
will not find my claims here persuasive, but making a case against their 
foundational claims is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Others might accept the normative claim that we should help the vulnerable, 
but might reject the descriptive claim, believing that we help the vulnerable too 
much or just enough. Those who believe we are helping the vulnerable too much 
would likely approve of the current system to some extent. Like those who 
reject my normative premise, they may see health information inequity as an 
appropriate way of extracting repayment. Those who believe that we already 
help the vulnerable just enough would not want the health information 
system to disturb the status quo. Vulnerable individuals do not need to repay 
anything, but they also do not deserve any additional solicitude. For this 
group then, the additional burdens (and benefits) that come from the health 
information system should be distributed equally. But even for this group, the 
existing system, which distributes burdens unequally, should be adjusted.  
C. Correcting Inequity 
Inequity can be remedied in three ways. First, we may “level up,” 
eliminating the new data collection programs and alleviating the burden on 
everyone. Second, we may compensate by providing the harmed group with 
an offsetting benefit. Third, we may “level down” by imposing the burden on 
everyone. 
The Introduction notes that the first solution is not off the table. Many 
believe that enhanced data collection is morally problematic or socially 
inefficient and that it should be stopped. As a normative matter, I believe that 
 
192 For examples of scholars that rely on the frameworks that I have discussed to make such an 
argument, see DANIELS, supra note 190, at 15-16, and WIEBKE KUKLYS, AMARTYA SEN’S CAPABILITY 
APPROACH: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS passim (2005). 
193 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 193-94 (1974). 
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there is no perfectly clear answer here—the relative weight of privacy versus 
health will depend on an individual’s history, circumstances, and cultural 
background. Procedural mechanisms such as the regular democratic process, 
which helps address clashing and incommensurate values and priorities 
among individuals, will determine the direction in which we must go. 
As a practical matter, that process—for the time being and with bipartisan 
support—has put in place a system that will result in enhanced data collection 
and use.194 It is highly unlikely that we will reverse course. But it is entirely 
possible that including richer individuals within the information dragnet will 
create resistance to the program, thereby changing the direction of information 
policy and reducing collection for all. Although I refer to this outcome as 
“leveling up,” it will actually affect a redistribution of wellbeing. Those who are 
not on public benefit programs would no longer be able to harness the advantages 
of research with the data of public beneficiaries. While those on the programs 
would also lose out on the benefits, they would also no longer be burdened and 
would therefore be relatively better off. This would be a sufficient solution to the 
equity problems I raise here. 
Second, one may offer offsets to individuals who suffer burdens. Indeed, 
some may say that individuals on public programs already receive offsets in 
the form of free or reduced-cost medical care. Further, we may also reasonably 
conclude that the analyses that come from the data will be most relevant to—
and most beneficial for—the groups who supply the data.195 
However, neither argument carries weight. The first argument adopts an 
inappropriate baseline for determining burdens and benefits. The previous 
Section assumes a general theory of social obligation, under which we owe 
duties to those who are poor, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable:196 the 
beneficiaries of public programs therefore receive no more than is their due 
under benefit programs. It is thus inaccurate to portray these as offsets.197 
Next, while public benefit recipients do benefit from the outcomes of 
these analyses, I have explained at length why they are not the only ones to 
benefit.198 For an offsetting benefit to create equity, it should only be given to 
those who suffer the harm. Distributing it across society, even to some degree, 
would render everyone better off, but still unequal. 
 
194 See Brady Letter, supra note 56, at 2 (“Access to protected [Medicare] data serves as a 
resource to look into the Medicare program’s costs, services, and trends.”). 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
196 See supra Section III.B. 
197 It is also incorrect to argue that the worse off are, by incurring risk for the good of others, 
“paying back” into the system. It is only just to obligate individuals to “pay back” if they owe 
something in the first place. But since the worse off obtain benefits because of independent moral 
considerations, they do not owe society anything—it is unjust to force them to repay what they do not owe. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 175–76. 
2017] Governing Health Information 1359 
Even if one concedes that all of society unfairly benefits from the burdens 
on Medicare and Medicaid recipients, to restore fairness, one might seek ways 
to ensure only that those who give data ultimately get access to the results of 
the analyses. But how could we implement this? For example, imagine that a 
doctor learns information about treating diabetes in children of a certain age. 
It is both impractical and unethical for her to apply this information when 
treating a child on Medicaid but ignore it when treating a diabetic child who 
does not receive Medicaid. 
But perhaps we could provide Medicaid and Medicare recipients other 
kinds of compensation for taking their information. In principle, that 
approach would bring us closer to equity. One could imagine a world in 
which, in return for a Medicare or Medicaid recipient’s health data, we 
provide more medical benefits, food stamps, or other benefits, according to 
the recipient’s need. To prevent selection biases, we could not make this a 
consent-based program, as some groups are more willing to provide their 
data—whether or not in return for benefits—than others.199 
While this approach would create a more equitable world, I remain 
troubled by its symbolic, expressive effects.200 Why, instead of spreading the 
data collection burdens across the population at minimal cost (as I propose 
below),201 would we choose to focus them on a vulnerable group of individuals 
and take their genetic, mental, or sexual history data? To what extent would 
such disparate policies reinforce differences between social groups? Even if 
the in-kind benefits outweigh any burdens at the individual level, one could 
reasonably believe that there may be harms at group level. There may be long-
term harms to the body politic even if an individual enjoys short term gains.202 
 
 
199 See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra Section II.C. 
201 See infra Section IV.B. 
202 I limit my hypothetical to one where we provide recompense in kind rather than in money 
because money is symbolically treacherous. Paying for something as intimately connected to an 
individual as health information risks increasing commodification of an important resource. Cf., e.g., 
RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
158-72 (Vintage Books ed., 1972) (arguing against the commercialization of blood donation). Both 
the research ethics literature and federal regulations treat monetary payments as posing autonomy 
concerns in many instances. See Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATION 1681, 1683-84 (2005)  (“Some worry that individuals with limited opportunities for 
earning money may be most susceptible to impaired judgement when faced with an offer of money 
. . . .”); see also ROBIN LEVIN PENSLAR & JOAN P. PORTER, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH 
PROTS.,  INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. III, § G (2008). However, those claims are 
highly contested in the literature. Others have suggested that aversion to such commercial transactions 
is badly conceived. See, e.g., Stephen Wilkinson, Commodification Arguments for the Legal Prohibition 
of Organ Sale, 8 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 189, 197-98 (2000) (arguing that commodification concerns 
over payments in exchange for organs are misplaced). 
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 The third approach to achieving equity is to use information from 
everyone for analyses. This “leveling down” approach would redistribute 
burdens toward those not on CMS programs. Assume, for example, that a 
particular research project requires one million records. The current framework 
would enable the project to draw all the records from those on Medicare and 
Medicaid, subjecting them to material and dignitary risks and harms. The 
solution I adopt in the next Part would require the project to draw some of 
these records from those not on CMS programs, easing the burden on CMS 
beneficiaries as a group. 
D. A Utilitarian Alternative 
Some may have wondered why I have not simply adopted a utilitarian 
approach to reach this solution, rather than relying on intuitions that not all 
might share. A utilitarian approach balances the burden to the individual 
(often measured both objectively and subjectively) against the benefit to 
health across society in general.203 A purely utilitarian approach will assert 
that contributions that optimize health across society at the least possible cost 
to the individual are just—though more complex variations are possible. 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, most varieties of a utilitarian principle prove 
inconclusive for my purpose, so I do not explore them in depth.204 
A utilitarian approach would optimize the process and maximize research 
benefits while minimizing burdens on individuals. Maximizing benefits might 
require us to collect data across social groups to have a well-functioning health 
information system. Although data from public benefit programs may be 
obtained cheaply, the data is also heavily biased toward elderly and low-
income individuals, and such bias can taint research.205 
For example, research shows that some social determinants may predict 
health outcomes better than genetic factors.206 Social conditions can also alter 
 
203 Risks must be “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the 
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) 
(2005); see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000) (noting that HIPAA balances the “needs of the individual with the 
needs of society”). 
204 See infra text accompanying note 208. 
205 Much of the literature on secondary health research has focused on the problem of bias—
individuals in minority and various other groups are less likely to provide their information, which 
generates biases in statistical studies. This prevents scientists from drawing robust conclusions 
regarding disease profiles and the effects of various behavioral, environmental, and other 
characteristics on health. See, e.g., NASS ET AL., supra note 4, at 209-14 (noting that “many small 
health care entities . . . serving disadvantaged populations are not participating in research[,] . . . 
[which] results in the underrepresentation of minority populations in many research studies”). 
206 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Debating the Cause of Health Disparities: Implications for Bioethics and 
Racial Equality, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 332, 333 (2012) (“It has been firmly 
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genetic expression, confounding the research pool.207 Accordingly, relying on 
data that is biased towards certain social groups can have problematic effects. 
Thus, the current system of collection might yield suboptimal social goods—
biased data—relative to its autonomy harms. To prevent this, we might collect 
data from all individuals—or at least a representative sample. For example, 
the United States Census Bureau collects data from only a small sample of 
Americans each year.208 
Yet, I do not delve deeply into a utilitarian approach because of a key 
problem—we simply do not have enough information to properly weigh costs 
and benefits. Although more data will be valuable, collecting data from non-
CMS populations could be expensive. If the government is the collecting 
entity, it must regulate private entities’ data quality, compel collection or 
sampling, and then combine the data for research. And there will be 
coordination costs if private data collectives run such programs. Incurring 
these costs without knowing the exact value gained from particular kinds of 
research is problematic. While social determinants of health are important, 
so are genetic determinants. It may therefore be cheaper to rely solely on 
CMS data and focus on genetic or other kinds of research in which biases in 
the dataset do not matter as much. Thus, although a utilitarian approach may 
well favor equity, given our current knowledge, I cannot predict how it will 
eventually cut.209 
 
established that the best predictor of health is an individual’s position in the social hierarchy. 
Hundreds of studies tracking the health of people along the social ladder show that health gradually 
worsens as status declines.”); see also Harry J. Heiman & Samantha Artiga, Beyond Health Care: The 
Role of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-social-
determinants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/ [https://perma.cc/K5KC-EQDC] (discussing 
how the ACA can help expand access to health coverage for underserved populations); NCHHSTP Social 
Determinants of Health: Frequently Asked Questions, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/socialdeterminants
/faq.html [https://perma.cc/HUB5-YQ6X] (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (discussing the numerous 
social determinants of health, such as education and income). 
207 See Alison Gopnik, Poverty’s Vicious Cycle Can Affect Our Genes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014, 
10:10 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/genes-play-a-role-in-poverty-1411567833 [https://perma.cc/
UU7Y-F75W] (“Twenty percent of American children grow up in poverty, and this number has been 
rising, not falling. Nearly a million are maltreated. The new studies show that this damages children, 
and perhaps even their children’s children, at the most fundamental biological level.”). 
208 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY (JAN. 2014): CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE DESIGN AND SELECTION 1 (2014), https://
www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/design_and_methodology/acs_design_
methodology_ch04_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4ZD-WTDN] (“Each year . . . , we selected 
approximately 2.9 million [housing unit] addresses in the [United States].”). 
209 Further, even if we had all the relevant facts, the cost–benefit analysis faces problems of 
valuation and time horizon. What, for example, is the appropriate timeframe? In assessing the value 
of longitudinal data, should we consider the potential benefits that will accrue ten years from now? 
One-hundred years from now? How exactly should we value individual autonomy in the balance? 
Will those values remain the same over time? 
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IV. USING LAW TO ACHIEVE EQUITY 
Law provides a discrete set of policy levers to achieve equity. First, 
adjusting Medicare and Medicaid, all-payer claims databases, and HIPAA 
regulations and policy can alleviate collection inequity. Next, additional 
regulations should be introduced to alter whose data is used in research and 
analysis. Lastly, all of the recommendations I offer require a restructuring of 
health information coordination tasks within HHS. Unless otherwise stated, 
I take it for granted that none of the solutions I offer present any constitutional 
challenges under existing law.210 
A. Collection 
1. EHR Data 
CMS can require EHR data reporting from patients with private 
insurance. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 gives CMS the authority to decrease fees for 
“covered . . . services” if a provider is not a “meaningful EHR user.”211 The 
Secretary has broad discretion to determine whether the use of data is 
“meaningful.” Meaningful use includes “using certified EHR technology in a 
meaningful manner,” and reporting on measures using EHR “in a form and 
manner specified by the Secretary, on such . . . measures as selected by the 
Secretary.”212 The Secretary may “requir[e] more stringent measures of 
meaningful use” as time progresses.213 
The Secretary also has broad discretion to define what makes a provider 
a meaningful user of health information. While she can adjust payments for 
services provided under Medicare and Medicaid, the reporting does not need 
 
210 In the health context, the Supreme Court has shown little appetite for questioning policy 
decisions regarding health information collection under the Constitution. In Whalen v. Roe, the 
closest on-point case, the Court rejected just such a challenge. See 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a state statute that required records of prescriptions for certain 
dangerous drugs be sent to the Department of Health as “a reasonable exercise of [the state’s] broad 
police power”); see also Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a due 
process challenge to the HIPAA routine data use exception). 
211 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(7)(i) (2012); see also id. § 1395w-4(o)(1)(A) (providing for incentive 
payments to meaningful EHR users but not after 2016). 
212 Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(A)(i), (iii). The Secretary must publish the measures in advance in the 
Federal Register. Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(i)(II). The Secretary must also “provide [a] preference” to 
clinical quality measures endorsed by the National Quality Forum. Id. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). The 
Forum provided a set of preliminary measures in 2011. See generally NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, 
IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL 2013 E-QUALITY MEASURES (2011), http://www.qualityforum.org/
Publications/2011/02/Meaningful_Use_Final_Report.aspx [https://perma.cc/SC3N-2Q3V]. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(A)(iii). 
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to concern those services. In other words, the Secretary could impose payment 
penalties for not reporting non-CMS beneficiaries’ information.214 
“[V]irtually all” hospitals215 and over 90% of primary care providers accept 
Medicare or Medicaid and would be affected by such penalties.216 As CMS 
has issued almost yearly updates on appropriate reporting measures and 
methodologies on meaningful use since the program’s inception,217 slowly 
incorporating the reporting of nonbeneficiary data is a viable approach.218 
All this data would be made available to the Patient Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute for secondary research under the ACA. Recall that CMS 
must “make available to the Institute such data collected . . . under” Medicare 
and Medicaid.219 The data would be reported “under” an incentive program 
connected to Medicare and Medicaid. 
As technology develops, we may consider alternative approaches to 
collecting data from all patients. One potential method is an interactive 
sampling approach in which the CMS data registry program looks at the patient’s 
profile and only accepts the data of those who are underrepresented in the 
pool.220 Similarly, under a distributed architecture model, which I discuss 
below,221 research would be done remotely, with no data collection. 
 
214 CMS may have already realized that it has this authority. Under the meaningful use 
program as it is currently constituted, providers must report certain clinical quality measures 
(CQM). Id. These are usually aggregate calculations based on all of the patients the doctors have 
seen. Thus, if the CQM is (number of minors taking certain medication) over (total number of 
minors), the provider must include all minors in her practice, not just those receiving Medicaid. As 
meaningful use transitions from seeking aggregate data reporting to transmission of granular EHRs, 
CMS should make data available, not just of the recipients of public benefit recipients, but of all 
individuals in the practice. As I explain below, this need not require CMS to collect the data itself. 
See infra note 286 and accompanying text. 
215 Senate Rules Comm., Bill Analysis: SB 233, Third Reading (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_233_cfa_20110518_160126_sen_floor.html [https://perma.cc/
S2S7-X95B]. 
216 Cristina Boccuti et al., Primary Care Physicians Accepting Medicare: A Snapshot, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/primary-care-physicians-
accepting-medicare-a-snapshot/ [https://perma.cc/J87Z-67BU]. 
217 See, e.g., 2016 Program Requirements, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-
guidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/2016programrequirements.html [https://perma.cc/D6U4-K64L] 
(last updated Feb. 14, 2017). 
218 What is key, of course, is for CMS to develop “the capacity to accept the information 
electronically” as the statute requires. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(B)(ii). 
219 Id. § 1320e(d)(3)(A). 
220 See generally Mansurul Bhuiyan et al., Interactive Pattern Mining on Hidden Data: A Sampling-
Based Solution, in CIKM ’12, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 95 (2012), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
2396777 [https://perma.cc/VK8H-H9SK] (describing the process and benefits of interactive sampling). 
221 See infra notes 240, 286 and accompanying text. 
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2. Claims Data 
Although EHR data collected through the CMS program will satisfy the 
needs of most secondary clinical research, claims data also has additional 
value for four reasons. First, and most importantly, under existing medical 
technology, the meaningful use program is probably a few years away from 
reasonably demanding that doctors report individual-level clinical measures. 
Claims data, however, has long been and will continue to be transmitted. 
Second, claims data contains information that EHR data lacks that is vital for 
health delivery planning, such as the price of services. Third, claims data goes 
back many years and therefore has “longitudinal depth.”222 Fourth, claims data 
can be useful as a cross check of EHR data to minimize data error. Hence, some 
secondary researchers argue that “neither claims data nor [EHR] data alone can 
provide a complete, accurate, and timely view of a person’s health status.”223 
Since the meaningful use program only gives CMS the authority to 
require meaningful use of EHR data, it lacks the authority to demand claims 
data. However, states have traditionally regulated insurance and created all-
payer claims databases, as described above.224 The federal government has so 
far not been involved in this effort in any substantial way.225 
After a recent decision by the Supreme Court, this must change. In 
Gobeille, the Court held that ERISA preempted states from requiring self-
funded plans to report data.226 In explaining why, the Court relied on the 
broad authority of the Department of Labor to require the reporting of 
information from self-insured plans.227 
 
222 Claims Data: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, FLOW HEALTH (May 16, 2014), http://blog.
flowhealth.com/claims-data-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/ [https://perma.cc/6HD8-HUAT]. 
223 WILSON & BOCK, supra note 25, at 4. 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
225 But it has provided grants to build APCDs. See The Center for Consumer Information & 
Insurance Oversight: Rate Review Grants, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Rate-
Review-Grants/index.html [https://perma.cc/T55F-GU7V] (describing the $250 million available to 
states for reviewing health care costs, some of which goes to fund data centers). 
226 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 65–67. 
227 The Court details this authority in the following passage: 
    The Secretary also may, “in connection” with any research, “collect, compile, 
analyze, and publish data, information, and statistics relating to” plans. [42 U.S.C.] § 
1143(a)(1); see also § 1143(a)(3) (approving “other studies relating to employee benefit 
plans, the matters regulated by this subchapter, and the enforcement procedures 
provided for under this subchapter”).  
ERISA further permits the Secretary of Labor to “requir[e] any information or data 
from any [plan] where he finds such data or information is necessary to carry out the 
purposes of” the statute, § 1024(a)(2)(B) . . . . The Secretary has the general power to 
promulgate regulations “necessary or appropriate” to administer the statute, § 1135 . . . . 
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 944 (alteration in original) (italics added). 
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So far, the Department of Labor has primarily sought information about 
plan financing.228 However, as the Court discussed,229 the Department of 
Labor can now work with the states (and HHS) to create a uniform system 
of insurance information reporting.230 And with the Court’s implicit blessing, 
such a plan is unlikely to face serious legal challenges, although other problems 
would remain.231 
Nonetheless, coordination will be required. A robust database requires 
claims data from both self-insured and other plans, which is impossible for 
one government level to achieve. ERISA prevents the Department of Labor 
from devolving all authority to collect self-insured data to states, as the Court 
was adamant that Congress did not intend for states to collect such data.232 
On the other hand, federalism and administrative authority concerns will 
prevent federal agencies from collecting data from all plans: ERISA gives the 
Department of Labor authority over only self-insured plans and the ACA 
gives HHS only limited data collection authority.233 A cooperative, voluntary 
federal–state venture would bring together the data that falls within the 
respective competencies of federal and state governments in a single data pool.234 
 
228 See id. at 954 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“ERISA-covered benefit plans must . . . file annual 
reports containing financial and actuarial data to . . . the Secretary of Labor . . . .”). 
229 See id. at 944 (majority opinion) (explaining that ERISA oversight systems “are intended 
to be uniform” across all fifty states); see also id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the grant 
of authority allows state–federal cooperation). 
230 Bill Sage also appears to suggest that Gobeille is a net positive for creating collaboration 
between states and the federal government. William Sage, Out of Many, One: ERISA Preemption, 
State All-Payer Claims Database Laws, and the Goals of Transparency, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 10, 
2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/10/out-of-many-one-erisa-preemption-state-all-payer-clai
ms-database-laws-and-the-goals-of-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/VWZ2-CERR]. 
231 For example, information collected by the Secretary is “public information,” except certain 
kinds of beneficiary information. 29 U.S.C. § 1026(a) (2012). 
The Secretary “shall make” such information available in various contexts. Id. However, to avoid 
constitutional problems, this requirement should, like CMS data, be read as subject to certain 
privacy protections and subject to at least the same procedural collection requirements as CMS data. 
For additional suggestions, see generally Bland et al., supra note 63, which discusses nonstate APCD 
options for further data collection. 
232 See Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 945 (majority opinion) (“[T]he uniform rule design of ERISA 
makes it clear that [decisions concerning the exemption self-insured plans] are for federal 
authorities, not for the separate States.”). 
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(3)(A) (2012) (listing the type of data that health plans must submit 
to the Secretary). Notably, the Department of Labor has relied on this specific authority in its 
rulemaking, rather than the more general authority cited in Gobeille. See 136 S. Ct. at 944 (describing 
the Secretary’s broad grant of authority to establish additional reporting and disclosure requirements 
for ERISA plans). 
234 Such a scheme would not be unprecedented. For example, “[t]he National (Nationwide) 
Inpatient Sample . . . is the largest publicly available all-payer inpatient health care database in the 
United States,” and was “[d]eveloped through a Federal-State-Industry partnership sponsored by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.” Overview of the National (Nationwide) Inpatient 
Sample, H-CUP, https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/nisoverview.jsp [https://perma.cc/YVU6-4G7U]. 
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3. The HIPAA Exclusion 
Some individuals will pay out of pocket, and their EHR and claims data 
may never be included in the medical record as I explain above.235 Changing 
this requirement would require amending the 2009 statute that put it into 
place.236 Nonetheless, the ability to exclude information from health records 
does serve some important purposes, and changes should be implemented 
carefully. Preventing providers from transmitting certain information to 
payers (and effectively, from including the information in the health record) 
when the patient pays out of pocket can assist vulnerable patients. For 
example, dependent children or spouses may want to conceal from the 
primary policyholder (or anyone else with access) that they had sought birth 
control or STD tests and may therefore pay out of pocket for the service.237 
Thus, while the out-of-pocket data exemption may allow the rich to exempt 
themselves from the data pool, it also allows certain individuals to take care 
of their health, avoid domestic violence, and exercise their autonomy. A 
nuanced statutory response is therefore necessary. 
One possible solution is to require a provider to comply with the data 
exclusion request only if the plan includes more than one member. In other 
cases, providers could be required to collect and enter health information. 
This allows vulnerable individuals to withhold data from the policyholder but 
would include the remaining data within the secondary research data pool. 
4. Data Collection from the Healthy 
As I explain above,238 healthier individuals escape information burdens 
even though their information can be extremely useful. Incentives should be 
introduced to encourage checkups that would both improve preventative 
medicine and allow for systematic health information collection from the 
healthy. In the meantime, data from wellness programs can help close the gap. 
First, we could institute tax incentives for preventative care and checkups for 
healthy individuals. Just as individuals must now generally carry health insurance, 
individuals would be required to go to the doctor to ensure that any diseases can 
be detected early and addressed more effectively at the least cost to society, and 
 
235 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(vi) (2013); see also supra text accompanying note 69. 
236 See 42 U.S.C. § 17935(a) (outlining when entities must comply with an individual’s request 
to restrict the disclosure of protected health information under 45 C.F.R. § 164.522). 
237 See Laura Covarrubias, The Girls’ Guide to Getting Some Privacy on Your Parents’ Health 
Insurance, BEDSIDER (May 16, 2013), https://bedsider.org/features/275-the-girls-guide-to-getting-
some-privacy-on-your-parents-health-insurance [https://perma.cc/2X52-JLTK] (providing tips for 
how to conceal treatments from parents while remaining on their health insurance). 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 75–78. 
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that their information can be used to benefit society as a whole.239 States might 
also mandate such checkups within their police power as they do vaccines. Other 
countries, such as Japan, are close to having similar requirements.240 
Until the point where such a program can be enacted, we might rely on 
wellness programs, where employers, rather than states, incentivize individuals 
to get checkups. These programs, which the ACA encourages, often offer 
incentives in the form of premium discounts or gift cards for participating 
employees of up to 30% of the premium amount.241 Incentives may also be 
tied to certain biometric outcomes that require employees to be tested for 
cholesterol, blood pressure, or body mass index. Some programs also allow 
testing for nicotine exposure.242 
There are many problems with wellness programs beyond the scope of 
this Article.243 However, for our purposes, what is key is that data from 
wellness programs will never become part of either EHR or claims reporting. 
 
239 At least one major presidential primary candidate has supported this approach in the past. 
See Amy Lorentzen, Edwards Backs Mandatory Preventive Care, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2007, 8:06 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090200743.html 
[https://perma.cc/4S6N-9BW6] (reporting that in 2007, John Edwards proposed a mandatory 
preventative care measure as part of his universal health care plan). Others have promoted similar 
ideas more recently. See, e.g., Dan Mangan, Take an ‘Unsick Day’: Paid Time Off for Your Health-Care 
Checkups, CNBC (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/10/take-an-unsick-day-
paid-time-off-for-your-health-care-checkups.html?source=twitter [https://perma.cc/F6DP-DZPF] 
(proposing a mandatory paid day off solely for the use of annual checkups and other preventive 
care). This approach, they argue, will reduce costs on the medical system and save lives. 
240 See Mami Maruko, Simple Tests Fill Health-Check Gaps, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/30/reference/simple-tests-fill-health-check-gaps/#.WSO
hFJOzJ3I [https://perma.cc/AZ56-5TLX] (“[H]ealth checkups are often mandatory for corporate 
or institutional employees . . . .”); see also Tom Lomax, What to Expect when Undergoing a Medical 
Check-Up in Japan, JAPAN TODAY (May 27, 2013, 6:29 AM), https://japantoday.com/category/feat
ures/health/what-to-expect-when-undergoing-a-medical-check-up-in-japan [https://perma.cc/F9V
H-YTQK] (“[R]egulations fall short of making it compulsory for employees to have an annual 
medical. However, government incentives are in place in larger firms to ensure that a high percentage of 
staff complete their check-up and file the report with their firm. This can lead to staff being pursued to 
have a medical even if they don’t want one.”). 
241 See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 33,158, 33,158 (June 3, 2013) (allowing premium discounts “in return for adherence to certain 
programs of health promotion and disease prevention”). The Affordable Care Act amended the 
HIPAA nondiscrimination and wellness provisions. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
242 See Kristin Madison, The ACA, the ADA, and Wellness Program Incentives, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (May 13, 2015), https://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/13/the-aca-the-ada-and-wellness-
program-incentives/ [https://perma.cc/Y9T5-Y9LU] (providing an overview of wellness programs 
and the respective federal regulation). 
243 For a good overview of the problems, see generally Special Issue: The Law and Politics of 
Workplace Wellness, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 955 (2014). 
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Although there is scant information about these programs,244 they can easily 
serve as data siphons for healthy individuals. Healthy individuals with jobs, 
who would otherwise have gone to doctors for annual checkups, can now 
confirm their own good health without ever contributing information to the data 
pool. Combining data from these programs into EHRs will create efficiencies, 
improve data protection, and address inequities in data collection and use. 
For wellness data to be collected, federal entities would likely have to 
intervene once more. After Gobeille, states are likely preempted from collecting 
such data. However, the ACA can be read to provide such authority to HHS and 
Labor. For example, it allows the departments to collect data for reports, and 
it gives them authority to promulgate additional regulations “in connection” 
with wellness programs.245 
5. Other Data Collection Policies 
Apart from slight alterations to existing regulatory and legal regimes, it 
may be possible to put into place stronger collection measures to ensure data 
collection from all providers, not just the vast majority that accept Medicare and 
Medicaid. This more intrusive approach would extend reporting requirements 
even further. 
States are best poised to impose this requirement. As the respondent 
observed during Gobeille oral arguments, instead of having self-insured plans 
report to all-payer claims databases, states could require providers to report 
claims data to the state.246 This could extend to the reporting of EHR 
information as well. The federal government could then coordinate with the 
states to ensure uniform reporting. 
Most states and the federal government currently lack the infrastructure 
and funding to establish such a program, and the incremental CMS-led 
program that I have proposed is more practical for now. However, several 
states are developing “health information exchanges.”247 Most of these entities 
focus only on data exchange between providers for treatment purposes. As the 
schemes progress, they should permit remote queries for clinical research purposes 
 
244 See Madison, supra note 242 (“[H]igh-quality evidence on the impact of employer wellness 
incentives is in short supply.”). 
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(n) (2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the 
Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, or the Treasury from promulgating regulations in 
connection with this section.”); see also id. § 300gg-4(m)(2) (permitting collection of additional data from 
employers who provide employees with access to wellness programs). 
246 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) 
(No. 14-181). 
247 See generally PRASHILA DULLABH ET AL., NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., EVALUATION 
OF THE STATE HIE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PROGRAM (2016). 
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as well.248 And the federal government should continue recently introduced efforts 
to assist such exchanges.249 
Congress could also probably impose collection requirements on large 
insurers and providers under its commerce power. It could also nudge states 
by providing limited incentives to impose such requirements over time.250 
Finally, it has also worked directly with providers to encourage data sharing. 
The Institute, for example, has set up links with numerous private networks 
to collect data,251 and President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative seeks 
to do the same.252 These programs’ guiding bodies must carefully assess which 
entities to include within these networks as part of a strategic plan to ensure 
that information collection burdens are widely distributed population-wide. 
B. Research 
This Article is focused primarily on the burdens of information collection, 
and changes in that process should be the first step toward equity. However, 
once collected, the data is then passed on to other entities for analysis. Each 
transfer or query of health information increases the risk of breach and the 
harms of commodification. There may be data breaches at the time of 
transmission, but also within research facilities. 
We must, at the very least, ensure that risk is equally distributed across 
groups. We can do so in various ways. For example, individuals whose data 
has been involved in multiple studies may suffer a higher risk of reidentification 
or breach than others, so their data should be exempted at some point if 
possible.253 We must also introduce steps to assess the background of the patient 
 
248 I should note that the new version of the Common Rule will only require institutional 
review board (IRB) approval from one IRB per research project in certain cases. Federal Policy for 
the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7208 (Jan. 19, 2017). Thus, a single approval 
would be sufficient for a researcher to get access to data statewide for a specific project. 
249 The federal government has provided assistance to these exchanges consistently. Most 
recently, however, it has declined to mandate such exchanges: “[W]e do not believe it is appropriate 
for us to require or mandate this option, as states may have various options or paths to increase 
EHR and HIE adoption outside of their managed care contracts.” Medicaid and Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) Programs; Medicaid Managed Care, CHIP Delivered in Managed 
Care, and Revisions Related to Third Party Liability, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,497, 27,649 (May 6, 2016). 
250 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (delineating the limits on 
“Congress’s power under the Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives”). 
251 See supra note 44. 
252 THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 40. 
253 See Comment Letter from Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney, Elec. Frontier Found., to Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs. Regarding the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Human Subjects 
Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, 
and Ambiguity for Investigators, Docket ID number HHS–OPHS–2015–0008, at 8 (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/07/eff_common_rule_nprm_comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB7
T-WFPA] (proposing such an exemption). 
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whose data is used to make sure that the burdens are spread across various 
social groups. At first, such an assessment would be based on a rough calculus 
that looks at how the patient paid for care and other demographic 
information. As time goes on and more data is collected in medical records, 
including social determinants of health, other, more exact parameters will 
include income information and other measures of welfare, ranging from age 
to family size or disability, as in the taxation context.254 
As I explain in Section III.B, however, some may argue that we should 
impose higher burdens on the better off.255 One might argue that all else being 
equal, we should use the data of individuals with less hardship for research.256 
For example, research seeking to identify the genetic determinants of a 
specific disease may not require representation from all socioeconomic groups. 
And as a general matter, depending on the study and the relevant statistical 
method, only a certain number of records need to be included to yield the 
appropriate statistical confidence.257 In cases where selection bias is minimal, 
we might focus information burdens on the richer and younger by prioritizing 
their information for transmission to researchers. Information coming from 
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries should be exempt to a greater degree. 
 
254 CMS has the ability to cross-reference data with beneficiary financial information. 
Medicare Parts B and D have income sensitive premiums. Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, 
Medicare’s Income-Related Premiums: A Data Note, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 3, 2015), 
http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicares-income-related-premiums-a-data-note/ [https://perma.cc/
A4K2-MK94]; see also Means-Testing of the Medicare Part B Premium, NAT’L COMMITTEE TO 
PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE (July 2009), http://www.ncpssm.org/Document/ArticleID/
777 [https://perma.cc/EG9F-GLM7] (“[T]he Social Security Administration (SSA) automatically 
determines the amount of the Medicare Part B premium using tax records filed with the Internal 
Revenue Service two or three years previously.”). 
255 See Belmont Report, supra note 12, at 23, 196-97 (“Some populations, especially institutionalized 
ones, are already burdened in many ways by their infirmities and environments. When research is proposed 
that involves risks and does not include a therapeutic component, other less burdened classes of persons 
should be called upon first to accept these risks of research.”). 
256 Those who reject such graduated risk distribution and argue that risk should be equally 
distributed across all individuals would reject this scheme. 
257 See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: UPDATE ON THE ADOPTION OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND RELATED EFFORTS TO FACILITATE THE ELECTRONIC USE 
AND EXCHANGE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 21-22 (2014), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/
default/files/rtc_adoption_and_exchange9302014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P5T-S2HA] (describing 
the Comprehensive Primary Care initiative, which “[i]n an effort to reduce providers’ quality 
reporting burden, . . . leverages the EHR Incentive Programs to measure quality by using a subset 
of the clinical quality measures specified for reporting”); see also THE PRECISION MEDICINE 
INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining statistical power requirements in nested unmatched case-
control design, which limit the number of people required to achieve desired levels of confidence in 
case control studies). 
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Information coming from self-paid patients, or those in higher priced insurance 
plans, may be subject to greater use.258 
There are of course limits to this goal of equitable adjustment. Analyses 
involving, for example, social determinants of health, are often biased based 
on population. In those cases, we must seek and use the information of those who 
are worse off to make sure that they remain represented in the data. 
When researchers seek data, IRB protocols should take into account 
equity principles and consider how the data request can be structured to 
distribute burdens equitably. CMS and its contractors can continue to review 
research requests, but in doing so, should also consider and discuss equity-
based considerations with researchers. 
C. Coordination 
Perhaps the biggest problem that faces the modern health information 
effort is that policymakers and scholars understand it through the traditional 
lens of health information collection during public health emergencies. 
Traditional collection does not comprise a single system. Each act of 
collection is justified by an immediate purpose—stopping a particular 
outbreak or running a specific trial. Each program is therefore “ad hoc . . . [:] 
the laws have developed by putting out fires, without comprehensive planning 
for modern public health problems.”259 
Because of this, policy and academic approaches also treat each act of 
collection as a standalone enterprise.260 Considerations advanced with respect 
to one health collection project, such as increasing the number of providers 
that are part of CMS’s meaningful use program, may prove completely 
inapplicable with respect to other health information projects such as the FDA’s 
post-market drug surveillance. Each subagency has collected information for 
agency specific projects: the FDA, for example, collects prescription data, 
 
258 See Health Plan Categories, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/health-
plan-categories/ [https://perma.cc/Y6US-5SQ6]. 
259 Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 476 (1986). 
260 A small group of scholars arguably provide a systematic approach by suggesting the creation 
of a national information market where trusted intermediaries can hold and sell the information—
recouping gains for the benefits of the patients and perhaps their providers. See Mark A. Hall, 
Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 638 
(2010) (arguing that “patients [should be allowed] to license limited rights to their medical 
information with trusted and regulated intermediaries”); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM 324-25 (1967) (“[Personal information . . . should be defined as a property right, with all 
the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process guarantees [of] our 
law of property . . . .”). But there is no indication that policy is moving in that direction, nor any 
guarantee that this will increase information access. Further, it would be nearly impossible to create 
a reliable and unbiased health information source with this approach. 
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CMS collects Medicare data, and so on.261 This may, in some cases, lead to 
waste and duplication—one can imagine multiple agencies accessing data 
from the same doctors regarding the same patients. This has prevented us 
from developing any systemwide principles or goals with which to evaluate 
health collection efforts at a more general level. 
The changes I recommend will require some form of coordination among 
government entities, resulting in the formation of a single entity or task force. 
This entity must oversee data coordination efforts through CMS, FDA, the 
Department of Labor, state claims databases, wearable devices, wellness 
programs, and consumer health initiatives. It must then ensure that data is 
accessed for research in ways that are fair by keeping track of all research 
projects. Where possible, the data of the same individuals or groups should 
not be used in a multitude of projects: risks should be evenly distributed. In 
addition to ensuring fairness, the entity could also play a role in curating data 
quality by coordinating data collection formats and avoiding data redundancy. 
This entity could also develop an optimum multi-database computational 
approach, though designers may also need to consider latency costs and 
duplication.262 As it currently stands, researchers may have to collect data 
from multiple sources and manipulate it in various ways to ensure that the 
metrics employed are congruent. With appropriate technology and standards, 
data need never be collected: all research queries could be done remotely. 
 
261 Medicare Part D data, that is, prescription data, might conceivably overlap with the data 
that the FDA collects through its Sentinel program which carries out post market surveillance of 
drug incidents. See infra note 262. 
262 Carol Diamond explains that in such a model, “personally identified information is held 
only at the source, and data are cleaned and analyzed in a common way . . . before being sent in a 
standardized format.” Carol C. Diamond et al., Collecting and Sharing Data for Population Health: A 
New Paradigm, 28 HEALTH AFF. 454, 459 (2009). Diamond, however, warns of a potential latency 
effect. See id. at 458 (“[M]any forms of analysis are significantly delayed, including those that should 
ideally be close to real time . . . .”). Distributed approaches may be fine for long-term tracking 
systems like the FDA’s mini-Sentinel system, see generally FDA, MINI-SENTINEL: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES (2013) (describing the Sentinel Initiative, a “long-term, multifaceted effort to create a 
national electronic system for monitoring the safety of FDA-regulated medical products”), but 
cannot work for real-time public health interventions. There may also be duplication issues without 
centralized storage. See CLAUDIA GROSSMANN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE FOR A LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 114-15, 150-51 (2010) 
(noting that the “chief disadvantage of [a distributive research network] is the patient deduplication 
issue”). Data lake approaches may offer a new alternative. See Kerry Raminiak, Data Lakes and the 
Promise of Unsiloed Data, PWC (May 6, 2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology-forecast/2014/
cloud-computing/features/data-lakes.html [https://perma.cc/M24A-DQYG] (describing how Data 
lakes allow “disparate records to be stored in their native formats for later parsing, rather than forcing 
all-or-nothing integration up front as in a data warehousing scenario”). Another alternative is a 
system that collects core data elements in a central location with the remaining elements distributed, 
as envisaged in the Precision Medicine Initiative. THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE, supra 
note 6, at 37. 
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There are three potential candidates for the coordinating role. The Patient 
Centered Outcomes Research Institute has been given the responsibility of 
developing, disseminating, prioritizing, and contracting for research to “assist 
patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health 
decisions.”263 It has the authority to “identify national priorities for research” 
through cost–benefit analysis.264 It may “also request and obtain data from 
Federal, State, or private entities, including data from clinical databases and 
registries.”265 The Institute itself is not a government entity,266 but is instead 
administered by a board of representatives from numerous private and public 
organizations.267 It is therefore well-positioned to work with all stakeholders 
in collecting data and disseminating research. 
Nonetheless, this strength might also be a weakness. For the Institute to 
create data collection initiatives that carry the force of law, it would need to 
become a government entity. Cooperation with other agencies might be 
undermined if private citizens sit on its board. Furthermore, the Institute is 
supported by a trust fund without additional appropriation.268 The amount in the 
trust fund is insufficient to support incentive programs for data collection such 
as meaningful use. 
Next, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is a subagency 
within HHS. One of the Agency’s purposes is to “enhance . . . health 
services” through a range of health-delivery and clinical research,269 provide 
research grants,270 and issue clinical guidelines.271 In particular, it is tasked with 
several data-focused objectives. It must assess “the utility and comparability of 
health information data and medical vocabularies by addressing issues related 
to the content, structure, definitions and coding of such information,” and 
must promote “the use of computer-based health records in all settings.”272 
Further, the Secretary, acting through the Director, “shall provide for the 
coordination of relevant Federal health programs . . . including the 
development . . . of . . . health outcomes research data networks, in order to 
 
263 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (2012). 
264 Id. § 1320e(d)(1)(A). 
265 Id. § 1320e(d)(3)(A). 
266 See id. § 1320e(b)(1) (noting that the Institute “is neither an agency nor establishment of 
the United States Government”). 
267 Id. § 1320e(f) (outlining the representatives from each industry that must comprise the 
Board of Governors). 
268 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(b)(3). 
269 Id. § 299(b). 
270 Id. § 299(a). 
271 See FRIENDS OF AHRQ, AHRQ: 15 YEARS OF TRANSFORMING CARE AND IMPROVING 
HEALTH 8 (2014) (“[AHRQ] provides physicians . . . detailed information on evidence-based 
clinical practice guidelines.”). 
272 42 U.S.C. § 299b-3(a)(5)–(6). 
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develop and maintain a comprehensive, interoperable data network to collect, 
link, and analyze data on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources, 
including electronic health records.”273 
However, the Agency’s mandate is too broad. Other priorities include 
developing decision aids to assist patients and doctors with shared 
decisionmaking.274 Second, it lacks authority with respect to data collection. 
At most, it can expect “voluntary collaboration” from private entities.275 
Third, it lacks authority even with respect to federal data networks: although 
it has the authority to issue data collection standards, “where [these] standards 
. . . may affect the administration of other [HHS] programs . . . , they shall be 
in the form of recommendations to the Secretary for such program.”276 
Indeed, the ACA deliberately put into place the Institute,277 which replicates 
many of the Agency’s functions. The Agency is tasked with assisting the Institute 
in “dissemination of the Institute’s research findings.”278 
The final candidate for coordinating the secondary research network is 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 
The Office was established in 2004, by executive order.279 The HITECH Act 
established this subagency by statute five years later to further the 
“development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure 
that allows for the electronic use and exchange of information” in order to 
“improve[] health care quality, reduce[] medical errors, reduce[] health 
disparities, . . . advance[] the delivery of patient-centered medical care,” and 
“facilitate[] health and clinical research and health care quality.”280 The 
Coordinator is given the task of “updat[ing] the Federal Health IT Strategic 
Plan . . . to include specific objectives, milestones, and metrics.”281 
Yet, when it comes down to brass tacks, the Coordinator lacks the 
authority to do much beyond issue technical specifications. His primary tasks 
are to “review and determine whether to endorse [health information technology] 
standard[s], implementation specification[s], and certification criteri[a],” and to 
“review Federal health information technology investments.”282 Incentive 
program money is not siphoned through the Office. Rather, the Secretary 
 
273 Id. § 299b-37(f). 
274 Id. § 299b-36. 
275 Id. 299b-7(a)(3)(A)(iv). 
276 Id. § 299c-2(a)(2). 
277 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1181(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 
728 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
278 42 U.S.C. § 299b-37(a)(2). 
279 David J. Brailer, Guiding the Health Information Technology Agenda, 29 HEALTH AFF. 586, 
586 (2010). 
280 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(b)(2),(8). 
281 Id. § 300jj-11(c)(3). 
282 Id. § 300jj-11(c)(1)(A),(C). 
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“invest[s] funds through the different agencies with expertise,”283 thus leaving 
authority with agencies outside the Office. Thus, real power remains with larger 
HHS agencies such as CMS and the FDA. 
There are two possible solutions to achieving coordination. First, the 
Secretaries of HHS and Labor could create a task force with representatives 
from Labor, the Agency, and the Office of the National Coordinator, with the 
Institute playing an advisory role. The combined statutory authority I recite 
above would provide this task force with the authority to direct information 
collection prerogatives. Even if CMS distributes the incentive money, its role 
would be mainly ministerial—the task force, with the authority of the 
Secretary behind it, would determine how the money should be distributed. 
Finally, Congress could combine the sometimes redundant functions of 
the various HHS agencies with respect to data collection and research into a 
single new agency. Only with this combined power could a coordinated research 
initiative be created that respects equity across data collection programs. 
CONCLUSION 
Health information collection carries great promise for society, but 
collection policies facilitate inequitable distribution of information burdens 
and risks. Although other forces may head off this inequity, ethical regulation 
would serve to distribute the burdens equitably across society to minimize 
the encumbrances on the poor and elderly. 
There are, of course, limits to the goal of equity. Sometimes equity will 
not be technically feasible if we are to help certain underserved populations. 
We must seek and use the information of those who are poor and elderly in 
order to assist them. Indeed, while this Article focuses on the burdens of health 
information collection and rendering them equitable, fairness also would 
suggest that the benefits of collection and research should go to those who are 
worse off, which is not always the case.284 
Some may also object to the organizational approach I offer, which 
appears to focus on government coordination, because of concerns arising 
from security and political pragmatism. Yet, the government may be as well 
or better placed to address security risk. As I note above, data can be stored in 
multiple locations and can be linked for specific queries.285 The government 
never holds on to the data itself.286 At the same time, a centralized government 
 
283 Id. § 300jj-31(a). 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 159–61. 
285 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
286 See, e.g., FDA, supra note 262, at 2 (“Mini-Sentinel uses a distributed data approach in 
which Data Partners retain control over data in their possession as a result of normal activities.”). 
Most breaches occur due to human error. Private health care providers “experience frequent staff 
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point of access can help us ensure that “only bona fide researchers can obtain 
access . . . to preserve privacy and confidentiality.”287 
These changes will not come about in a straightforward way. Equity 
intersects with other values—autonomy in individual encounters, consent 
requirements, and political and technological feasibility, to name a few. As 
conversations progress, different visions of autonomy and solidarity, and 
beneficence and benefit, will be tested. As these visions are deployed in 
administrative and legislative crucibles, compromises, piecemeal, and 
pluralistic policies will take shape. Data collection efforts will be stalled and 
delayed. But in general, the result will be a system that best conforms to our 
deepest ideals of justice in the distribution of obligation. 
Stepping back to consider the ethics of health information collection at 
the systemic level—rather than at that of individual encounters—reveals it to 
be a site where visions of citizenship play out. Individuals and the community 
mutually constitute and assist each other through this information. Bioethics 
demands, and law must create, a system of just obligations that bind both 
individuals and society to each other at the site of health information collection. 
 
turnover, which results in a continual challenge of adequately educating” the staff. GROSSMAN ET 
AL., supra note 262, at 195. Training workers in a single organization may be far easier than ensuring 
that multiple entities meet training requirements. Further, providers have experienced breaches that 
have been comparable to or worse than those of the government. Compare Sisi Wei & Charles 
Ornstein, Over 1,400 Health Data Breaches, but Few Fines, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
projects.propublica.org/graphics/healthcare-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/9WYM-TMLH] 
(documenting 1419 large-scale data breaches within health care organizations and their business 
partners from 2009 through 2015), with A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1019, 1027 (2009) (citing one study which documented “110 breaches of state 
. . . federal, and military databases in 2008”). Indeed, the rate at which government entities suffer 
breaches has declined. See id. at 1027 n.35 (noting that there has been a fifty percent drop in reported 
breaches of U.S. government data from 2006 through 2009). Further, “those who aggregate and 
mine [big] data neither view their informational assets as public goods held on trust nor seem 
particularly interested in protecting the privacy of their data subjects.” Terry, Protecting Patient 
Privacy, supra note 11, at 389. Indeed, “[t]he truth lies in the opposite because the big data business 
model is selling information about their data subjects.” Id. Some others contend that the big data 
business model is even using data to discriminate. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 163, at 108 n.43 
(“There are also legitimate worries about discriminatory uses of information either not covered by 
existent privacy or anti-discrimination laws, or undetectable by workers.”). 
287 Donna M. Gitter, The Challenge of Achieving Open Source Sharing of Biobank Data, in 
COMPARATIVE ISSUES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH BIOBANKS 165, 185 (Giovanni 
Pascuzzi et al. eds., 2013). Many suggest that smaller, decentralized data holding might be less 
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